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The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was cre-
ated by legislation passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the president
in 1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) created the TANF program out of the preexisting Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which itself was created
by Congress in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act. The PRWORA leg-
islation represented the most fundamental restructuring of the AFDC pro-
gram since its inception. The most important restructured elements are
(a) the devolution of major program design elements, and ﬁnancing
through block grants, to the individual states; (b) the imposition of strict
work requirements in order to qualify for federal aid; and (c) lifetime lim-
its on the number of years of beneﬁt receipt which could be paid out of fed-
eral funds.
This paper reviews the rules and structure of the TANF program and
compares them with the historical AFDC program. In addition, it reviews
the caseloads, costs, and participation rates of the TANF and AFDC pro-
grams. Finally, it reviews the research that has been conducted on both
programs. Given the relative youth of the former, relatively little scholarly
research has been conducted on it to date. Consequently, the bulk of the re-
search will be reviewed for the AFDC program. Some discussion will also
be provided of the extent to which the results of the AFDC research can be
expected to apply to the TANF program.
Robert A. Moﬃtt is professor of economics at Johns Hopkins University and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The author would like to thank Daniel Gubits for research assistance.
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The Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Program
Robert A. MoﬃttThe ﬁrst section reviews the rules and history of the programs. The sec-
ond section reviews the trends in caseloads and expenditures and other
program characteristics, followed by a section on the research results. Sec-
tion 5.4 reviews research on the TANF program. A ﬁnal section discusses
reforms of the ﬁnancial incentives in the program.
5.1 History, Rules, and Goals
5.1.1 History and Rules of the AFDC Program
Table 5.1 shows the major pieces of legislation creating and altering the
AFDC program over its history, 1935–96.1The program was created by the
Social Security Act of 1935 along with the Old-Age Social Security and
Unemployment Insurance programs. The AFDC program provided cash
ﬁnancial support to families with “dependent” children, who are deﬁned
as those who were deprived of the support or care of one natural (i.e., bio-
logical) parent by reason of death, disability, or absence from the home,
and were under the care of the other parent or another relative. Although
the language of the legislation was gender-neutral, in practice the vast ma-
jority of families of this type consisted of a mother and her children, or
what are today called single-mother families. Although the presence of the
father was possible if he was the single parent or if he was disabled, the
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Table 5.1 Major Legislation in the AFDC and TANF Programs
Date Title of Legislation Main Provision
1935 Social Security Act Created the AFDC program for low-income children without 
a parent present in household
1961 Amendments to the Social  Created AFDC-UP program for children in two-parent families 
Security Act where primary earner is unemployed
1967 Amendments to the Social  Lowered the beneﬁt reduction rate to two-thirds; created the 
Security Act WIN program
1981 Omnibus Budget Recon- Increased the beneﬁt reduction rate to 1; imposed a gross 
ciliation Act of 1981 income limit; counted income of stepparents; expanded
waiver authority
1988 Family Support Act of 1988 Created the JOBS program for education, skills training, job 
search assistance, and other work activities; created 
transitional child care and Medicaid programs; mandated 
AFDC-UP in all states
1996 Personal Responsibility and  Abolished the AFDC program and created the TANF program
Work Reconciliation Act
1. A short, but more detailed, history of the major developments in the AFDC program can
be found in Garﬁnkel and McLanahan (1986, chap. 4). That discussion also includes an ac-
count of the history of income support programs prior to AFDC.overwhelming majority of participating families were initially, and have
continued to be, those in which the father is not present. In 1935 the pri-
mary reason for the absence of the father was death, but this was to change
in later years as that absence was more a result of divorce or out-of-
wedlock childbearing. Eligibility also required that families have income
and assets below speciﬁed levels.
The AFDC program was created as a shared federal and state responsi-
bility. The states had a large role in the program, for they were responsible
for not only creating and administering their own AFDC programs but
also setting the level of basic beneﬁts. States subsequently picked very
diﬀerent beneﬁt levels, with beneﬁts ranging sixfold from the most gener-
ous to the least generous. The federal role was both ﬁnancial and regula-
tory. Financially, the federal government was responsible for providing
open-ended matching grants to the states, with declining match rates at
higher state beneﬁt levels. On the regulatory side, the federal government
put many restrictions on the deﬁnition of eligibility and allowable re-
sources but also on the beneﬁt formula. In terms of eligibility, for example,
the federal government deﬁned what family structures were eligible and
put restrictions on who could and could not be counted as part of the as-
sistance unit, and also on what income and assets could be counted for el-
igibility determination. Regarding the beneﬁt formula, the federal govern-
ment put restrictions on allowable deductions for earned income and also
for child care and work-related expenses, eﬀectively constraining the state’s
ability to set the beneﬁt reduction rate in the program. Thus the states
ended up being primarily responsible for the level of beneﬁts, or what econ-
omists call the “guarantee,” while the federal government eﬀectively set the
beneﬁt reduction rate, which economists sometimes call simply the “tax
rate.” The nominal beneﬁt reduction rate in the program in 1935 was 100
percent, for beneﬁts were determined by a straightforward subtraction of
income from “needs” (i.e., the guarantee), and there were few deductions
for income allowed.2
The deﬁnition of a dependent child as resulting from the absence or dis-
ability of a parent implicitly allowed families to be eligible where the
mother (or father) had remarried or was cohabiting with a partner who
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2. Additional complexities were present because the states actually had the right to manip-
ulate the beneﬁt formula in ways that altered even the tax rate. For example, states could im-
pose maximums on the beneﬁt paid to a family, which creates a range of a zero tax rate; they
could reduce the diﬀerence between the guarantee and net income (deﬁned as income less de-
ductions) by a deﬁned fraction (called the “ratable reduction”), which eﬀectively reduces the
tax rate by that fraction; and they could impose gross income ceilings for eligibility, which cre-
ate a notch in the budget constraint. They also had discretion in setting allowable deductions,
which alters the eﬀective tax rate as well. See U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means
(1996), Keane and Moﬃtt (1998, appendix), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001, appendix 1)
for more details on the formula in diﬀerent states. States are allowed even more discretion
over the beneﬁt formula under the new TANF program (see subsequent discussion).was not a parent of the child. Further, stepparents and cohabitors were ex-
cluded from the deﬁnition of the assistance unit for purposes of eligibility
and beneﬁt determination, so their income was not automatically counted
against beneﬁts. In principle the income they provided to the eligible chil-
dren should be counted as income to the assistance unit, but rigorously
measuring intrahousehold income ﬂows is diﬃcult, so the enforcement of
this principle was minimal. However, in 1935 the rate of remarriage was
fairly low and the rate of cohabitation was even lower, so these issues did
not attract discussion; they did so only later when these types of families
grew in the general population and in the AFDC recipient population.
A signiﬁcant expansion of the program took place in 1961 when Con-
gress created the AFDC-UP (for “unemployed parent”) program to in-
clude families in which both natural parents were present but where the pri-
mary earner was unemployed, with unemployment deﬁned as the inability
to ﬁnd work in excess of 100 hours per month. The income and asset eligi-
bility conditions and beneﬁt formulas were identical to those in the basic
AFDC program. The AFDC-UP program was made optional to the states,
with ﬁnancing at the same rate as in basic AFDC, and twenty-ﬁve states
had created and operated such programs by the end of the decade.
The next major change in the program occurred in 1967 when Congress,
concerned with work incentives in the program, lowered the nominal tax
rate on earnings from 100 percent to 67 percent (by two-thirds, to be ex-
act). States were required to deduct $30 and one-third of remaining
monthly earnings from total monthly income before calculating the bene-
ﬁt (hence the “thirty-and-one-third” rule). The Social Security Amend-
ments in 1967 also created a program called the Work Incentive (WIN)
Program, which required women whose youngest child was older than six
and who did not fall into a number of exempt categories (disabled, in
school, etc.) to register for some type of work or education activity, usually
some type of job placement program. The WIN program was never eﬀec-
tive, for, while the majority of nonexempt recipients were registered, states
did not provide the funds or exert the eﬀort to set up the necessary activi-
ties to engage more than a small number of registrants. Although there
were almost no evaluation studies of WIN conducted (see below), there
was nevertheless a widespread perception that the job placement opera-
tions in place were also quite ineﬀective.3
A number of Supreme Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s
were also important in modifying key features of the program. One out-
lawed what were called state “man-in-the-house” rules, rules which made
ineligible for beneﬁts mothers who were living, even on a temporary basis,
with men who were not the natural fathers of the children. The court
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3. See Lalonde (chap. 8 in this volume) for a more detailed discussion of the WIN program
and its evolution.judged these laws to violate the original Social Security Act provision stip-
ulating that eligibility was based solely on the absence of the natural father.
A second, related decision prohibited states from counting the income of
any such cohabiting men against the AFDC beneﬁt without speciﬁc evi-
dence that the men were providing income support to the woman and chil-
dren; some states had been automatically including the male’s income
when calculating beneﬁts. A third decision outlawed so-called residency
requirements that some states had adopted, which required families who
had moved into a state to live there for a few years before eligibility could
be established. The court judged these laws to violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and to impose an unlawful restriction on free-
dom of residential location.
The growth of the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs in the late 1960s
and early 1970s also aﬀected the AFDC program. Eligibility for the Food
Stamp Program, although open to all individuals regardless of family type,
was made automatic for AFDC recipients. Thus a close tie between the
programs was established, and participation in the AFDC program con-
stituted a guaranteed entry to the Food Stamp Program. Families in the
AFDC program were also made categorically eligible for the Medicaid
program, signiﬁcantly raising the generosity of program beneﬁts. Unlike
the case of food stamps, however, non-AFDC recipients faced more diﬃ-
cult eligibility hurdles for Medicaid and were often ineligible until the
1980s (see the chapter on Medicaid in this volume). A third program of
some importance that grew more in the 1980s is the Earned Income Tax
Credit, whose amounts were required by Congress to be excluded from
AFDC recipient income for the purpose of beneﬁt calculation in order to
encourage work.4
Throughout the 1970s a number of welfare reform proposals were con-
sidered by the federal executive branch but were either never proposed to
Congress or were proposed and not passed. The Nixon administration pro-
posed, with its Family Assistance Program, replacing AFDC with a pro-
gram more resembling a negative income tax—with a low marginal tax
rate—and which would have federalized the program and hence removed
it from the control of the states, a reform much discussed in the 1970s in an
attempt to eliminate the large cross-state variation in beneﬁts. The legisla-
tion did not pass Congress. The Ford administration considered a welfare
reform proposal with a number of features but, most notably, a consider-
able strengthening in the work requirements of the program. The program
was never submitted to Congress. The Carter administration submitted to
Congress a major welfare reform proposal which, like the Family Assis-
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4. Food stamp beneﬁts were also excluded from the AFDC beneﬁt calculation, as were
housing subsidies in most states. Supplemental Security Income beneﬁts were excluded, but
SSI recipients were not allowed to be covered by AFDC anyway (i.e., they were excluded from
the AFDC assistance unit).tance Program, would have federalized the program but which introduced,
for the ﬁrst time, signiﬁcant added work requirements. The legislation was
not passed by Congress.
The next major piece of legislation passed by Congress was the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which had several important features.
The tax rate on earnings in the program was increased to 100 percent, up
from the 67 percent provided for in the 1967 amendments, on the argument
that this would concentrate beneﬁts on the lowest income families and
hence those most in need.5 In addition, for the ﬁrst time Congress required
states to count a portion of stepparent income against the grant regardless
of the amount of ﬁnancial support that the stepparent might be deter-
mined, by some calculation, to have provided to the mother and her chil-
dren. Congress also put an upper limit on the gross income that a family
could have to be eligible, thus eliminating the possibility that high levels of
deductions could allow such families onto the rolls. A fourth important
feature of the legislation, little noticed at the time but which became im-
portant later, was a provision encouraging states to experiment with new
AFDC work provisions that were at variance with federal law and federal
regulations, and to seek waivers to test alternative provisions that they
might be interested in. The “WIN demonstrations” of the 1980s, as they
were called because they were modiﬁcations of WIN, allowed states to ex-
periment with community work programs, work supplementation pro-
grams, heightened job search, and other programs to strengthen the em-
phasis on work and improve upon their WIN programs.
Subsequent to 1981 and throughout the early and mid-1980s, states be-
gan taking advantage of the waiver provisions in the 1981 Act and, even-
tually, virtually all states conducted WIN demonstrations. These demon-
strations typically tested low-cost programs that required some type of job
search activity, although some also required recipients to simply work—
usually in some community service job like cleaning up a public park—in
exchange for their beneﬁts (“workfare”). A few states were more ambitious
and tested more expansive employment programs that attempted to pro-
vide more basic skills training or substantive work experience. Many of the
demonstrations also narrowed the list of conditions allowing a recipient to
be exempt from participating in these programs. The 1980s thus witnessed
the beginning of signiﬁcant AFDC reform activity initiated at the state and
local levels, a new trend in light of the history of reform activity, which had
theretofore occurred primarily at the federal level.
The state activity on increased work requirements led to increased con-
gressional interest in work and culminated in the passage of the 1988 Fam-
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5. The recipient was allowed to work for four months with the thirty-and-one-third reduc-
tion rule, but further earnings were taxed at the 100 percent rate. Later, the ﬂat $30 exemption
amount was allowed for twelve months.ily Support Act, whose most important feature was the creation of the
Job Opportunities (JOBS) program. The JOBS program replaced WIN
and was to require much larger numbers of welfare recipients to engage in
work-related activities, both by reducing the number of exempt recipients
and by mandating that states engage a minimum fraction of eligible recip-
ients in some type of acceptable activity (called “participation” require-
ments). In addition, and equally important, the legislation strongly en-
couraged, and partly required, states to conduct not only low-cost job
search programs that had been dominant in the WIN demonstrations but
also some human capital, education, and training programs that would in-
crease job skills of AFDC recipients, a major change in orientation.6
However, over the years subsequent to 1988, states failed to implement
JOBS programs to any signiﬁcant degree. They failed to draw down all the
federal matching funds made available to them to subsidize the programs,
and they did not put in place the necessary programs to enroll eligibles on
a wide scale. As a result, many states never achieved the participation re-
quirements in the act. The most common explanation for this failure was
the onset of a recession in the late 1980s, which put pressure on state bud-
gets and made it diﬃcult to allocate funds to JOBS, but the administrative
diﬃculty in creating JOBS programs was gradually realized to have been
underestimated, and this also played a role. It was also gradually realized
that full implementation of the JOBS program would require a signiﬁcant
increase of expenditures and hence was unlikely in the short run to gener-
ate cost savings.7
In an attempt to provide more ﬁnancial work incentives, the Family Sup-
port Act also required states to oﬀer transitional child care and Medicaid
beneﬁts, beneﬁts provided to families who had left the welfare rolls because
of employment or increased earnings, for up to twelve months following
exit. States were allowed to require copayments for child care and were re-
quired to charge premiums for the second six months of Medicaid beneﬁts.
In practice, these provisions were little used by exiting welfare mothers, for
reasons that have never been fully studied. Some experts speculated that
the paperwork burden of continuing to establish eligibility combined with
the relatively short time frame of extended beneﬁts (twelve months), to-
gether with the copayment and premium provisions, discouraged take-up.
Finally, the Family Support Act expanded AFDC-UP, mandating that
all states oﬀer the program. However, the law only required states to oﬀer
beneﬁts to unemployed families for six months out of the year, and many
states initially without UP programs elected to meet only this minimum re-
quirement when creating their program subsequent to the act.
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6. See U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means (1994) for a discussion of the JOBS
program rules and see Gueron and Pauly (1991) for a discussion of the shift in employment
philosophy that JOBS represented.
7. See the chapter by LaLonde in this volume for a more detailed discussion of JOBS.Although the Family Support Act of 1988 was considered at the time to
be landmark legislation that would lead to fundamental changes in the
program, its failure to do so has left it as a fairly minor and transitional
piece of legislation in the history of the AFDC program. Interest in further
reforms of the system did not die down after the act but instead increased
in intensity. For example, the goals of reform started shifting almost im-
mediately from the human capital, education, and training emphasis em-
bodied in the act to an emphasis on work per se, regardless of training
content. Another notable shift subsequent to the act was a shift toward
caseload reduction per se as a goal, which had not been a major focus of
the act. In part this change may have been a result of the rising caseloads
and expenditures in AFDC over the late 1980s and early 1990s (see below).
Finally, an increased interest in family structure issues and nonmarital
childbearing occurred in the period subsequent to the act.
This increased welfare reform activity took place, as it had in the 1980s,
mainly at the state level. With encouragement from the Bush and Clinton
administrations, states over the early 1990s increased their initiation of
AFDC waiver programs testing alternative features of reform. An in-
creased emphasis on work requirements, in particular to the exclusion of
human capital and education programs as just noted, was present in al-
most all state eﬀorts. Most states also began imposing sanctions (i.e., tem-
porary or permanent withdrawal of beneﬁts) on recipients for failure to
comply with work and other requirements. Although such sanctions had
been present in some form previously, they had never been as aggressively
enforced. The increased emphasis on work requirements was often ac-
companied in the waiver programs as well by a reduction of marginal tax
rates on earnings to provide ﬁnancial incentives to work, for the federal
rules still required 100 percent rates. Many other features also began to be
introduced, including (a) the provision of time limits on beneﬁts, stipulat-
ing that recipients could not receive beneﬁts for more than a certain num-
ber of years (two to ﬁve, for example), at least within a given calendar
period; (b) the imposition of family caps, which speciﬁed that AFDC
recipients would not receive higher beneﬁts if they had additional children
while on AFDC; and (c) an attempt to reintroduce residency requirements
by formulating two-tier programs under which immigrants were not denied
beneﬁts but rather were given lower beneﬁts than initial residents for some
speciﬁed period.
Another new feature of the state waiver programs in this period was an
increased tendency to test programs that contained multiple reform fea-
tures simultaneously, for example, simultaneously strengthening work re-
quirements, enforcing sanctions, imposing time limits and family caps, and
the like. Prior to this period, the waiver programs formulated by states had
tested only one or two reform features at one time. These reform packages
were intended to test new programs that diﬀered in their entirety from the
298 Robert A. MoﬃttAFDC program and were intended to have a cumulative impact greater
than the sum of the impact of each reform individually. More generally,
they represented a political desire for a major, wholesale change in the
AFDC program rather than incremental change.8
A ﬁnal new feature of the waiver programs over this period was an in-
creased tendency to test the new programs on the entire state AFDC case-
load, whereas prior to this period the waiver programs had been tested on
the caseload in only one or two counties, cities, or local oﬃces. These
statewide waivers had the eﬀect of essentially replacing the existing AFDC
program with the reform program for the entire state, at least for the life-
time of the waiver, which was usually several years. As waivers of this type
grew in number—forty states had requested and been granted waivers by
1995—the waivers gradually ceased to be small-scale experiments and be-
gan to envelope a major portion of the national caseload and hence to
gradually eliminate the AFDC program de facto.9
5.1.2 TANF
Congress subsequently took action in 1996 by enacting PRWORA,
which simultaneously reduced federal authority over the program but also
mandated many (but not all) of the popular state-level waiver features with
federal law. Table 5.2 summarizes the diﬀerences between AFDC and
TANF. The PRWORA legislation converted the previous matching grant
to a block grant and removed much of the federal regulatory authority over
the design of the program. Thus states are free to set their beneﬁt levels, as
before, but also the tax rate, income limits, asset requirements, and even the
form of assistance (cash or in-kind services). The last provision is impor-
tant because it allows states to use TANF dollars to support child care, job
search support, social services, and other types of expenditure; there are
no requirements on how much or little must be spent on cash aid directly.
In addition, no federal deﬁnition of who is to be included in the assistance
unit is imposed; the AFDC-UP program is abolished, and states cover two-
parent families at their own discretion. States are free to impose family
caps. In addition, and importantly, the entitlement nature of the program
is abolished and states are not required to serve all eligibles.
At the same time, however, the law imposed new federal authority in a
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8. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS; 1997) and Harvey, Ca-
masso, and Jagannathan (2000) for a summary of the provisions of the state waiver programs
in this period.
9. The federal government generally required states to conduct random-assignment evalu-
ations of their reforms. When states moved to implementing reform programs on the full state
caseload, they usually complied with this requirement by holding out a small group of con-
trol families to be administered the old AFDC program. A major problem with these experi-
ments was that it was diﬃcult to prevent the control families from perceiving, and being
aﬀected by, the overall programmatic change in the state that occurred around them. See sub-
sequent discussion.Table 5.2 Comparison of the AFDC and TANF Programs
Item AFDC TANF
Financing Matching grant Block grant
Eligibility Children deprived of support of one  Children in low-income families as 
parent or children in low-income two- designated by state; AFDC-UP abol-
parent families (AFDC-UP) ished; minor mothers must live with 
parents; minor mothers must also at-
tend school
Immigrants Illegal aliens ineligible Aliens ineligible for ﬁve years after en-
try and longer at state option
Form of aid Almost exclusively cash payment States free to use funds for services and
non-cash beneﬁts
Beneﬁt levels At state option Same
Entitlement status Federal government required to pay  No individual entitlement
matched share of all recipients
Income limits Family income cannot exceed gross  No provision
income limits
Asset limits Federal limits No provision
Treatment of  After four months of work, only a  No provision
earnings disregards lump sum $90 deduction plus child 
care expenses, and nothing after 
twelve months
Time limits None Federal funds cannot be used for pay-
ments to adults for more than sixty
months lifetime (20 percent of caseload
exempt)
JOBS program States must oﬀer a program that  JOBS program abolished
meets federal law
Work requirements Parents without a child under three  Exemptions from work requirements 
required to participate in JOBS are narrowed and types of qualiﬁed 
activities are narrowed and prespeci-
ﬁed (generally excludes education 
and classroom training) and must be 
twenty hours per week rising to 
thirty hours per week for single 
mothers
Work requirement  JOBS participation requirements Participation for work requirements 
participation  rise to 50 percent by ﬁscal year 2002
requirements
Child care Guaranteed for all JOBS participants No guarantee, but states are given in-
creased child care funds
Sanctions General provisions Speciﬁc provisions mandating sanc-
tions for failure to comply with work
requirements, child support enforce-
ment, schooling attendance, and other
activities
Child support States required to allow ﬁrst $50 of  No provision
child support received by mother to 
not reduce beneﬁt
Source: Burke (1996).few speciﬁed areas. Federal funds are not to be used to pay adults for more
than sixty months of TANF beneﬁts over their lifetimes, although states
are allowed an exemption from this requirement for 20 percent of their
caseloads. Minors who have dependent children are required to stay in
school and live with their parents in order to receive federal TANF dollars.
Aliens are ineligible for ﬁve years after their entry into the United States
and longer at state option. In addition, while the JOBS program is abol-
ished, new work requirements are imposed that require that much greater
fractions of the caseload be involved in them, and which exempt many
fewer families (as many as 50 percent of single mother recipients and 90
percent of two-parent families must comply). Recipients involved in gen-
eral education and training cannot be counted toward these participation
requirements. The hours of work per week required are also greatly in-
creased (up to thirty hours per week for single mothers and more for two-
parent families).10
The most dramatic departures from the AFDC program are the time
limit and work requirement provisions. Lifetime time limits are a new con-
cept in U.S. transfer programs and are based on a quite diﬀerent philoso-
phy of the aims of public assistance than has been the case heretofore.
States are allowed certain types of exemptions from the time limits and are
also allowed to grant temporary extensions to individual families, so long
as the total number does not exceed 20 percent of the caseload. The work
requirements in the new legislation are much stronger than in previous law
and change the orientation from education and training to work per se.
The law also allows states to impose sanctions on recipients for failure to
comply with the work requirements, sanctions that are much stronger than
in past law and which have been enforced rigorously. The work emphasis
of the law is further reinforced by an increase in the funds made available
for child care.11 At the same time, any system of work requirements must
specify some exemptions from them, and states are allowed to exempt fam-
ilies with speciﬁed types of diﬃculties.
Several other PRWORA provisions are worth noting for their impor-
tance. States are required to maintain expenditures from their own funds
at a level at least 75 percent of that prior to PRWORA (the so-called
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10. The law imposed speciﬁc penalties on the states for not complying with these mandated
provisions. These penalties took the form of percentage reductions in the block grant alloca-
tion for each type of violation. The work participation requirements have been considerably
ameliorated thus far by another provision of the law that reduces those requirements in pro-
portion to the amount of caseload reduction a state experiences. Because caseloads have
fallen dramatically, these participation requirements have been greatly reduced as well. How-
ever, this provision of the law also gives states an incentive to reduce the caseload because it
lowers the level of mandated work requirements.
11. However, the guarantee of child care that existed under AFDC is abolished. That guar-
antee was widely seen by states as a constraint on their ability to increase employment among
recipients.“maintenance of eﬀort” provisions). This maintains a semblance of a
matching grant system in the short to medium run. A major point of dis-
cussion between the federal government and the states has been over
whether these funds can only be spent on recipients eligible for TANF dol-
lars or can be more generally spent and, if the latter, whether there are any
categories of expenditure that funds cannot be spent on. Regulations is-
sued in the spring of 1999 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) interpret the law fairly broadly and allow the funds to be
spent on a wide variety of sources, giving states considerable ﬂexibility as
a result. Another important ﬁnancing provision was the creation of a con-
tingency fund for the states to draw on in times of high unemployment. The
strong performance of the U.S. economy since 1996 has made this contin-
gency fund of little relevance thus far, but it could be important in the fu-
ture if the economy turns down. Another provision in PRWORA provides
for bonuses to the ﬁve states who most reduce their out-of-wedlock child-
bearing rates and their abortion rates.
Since the 1996 act, states have moved forward vigorously to design
TANF programs that are very diﬀerent from their AFDC programs prior
to 1990, not only to comply with the provisions of the law but also to alter
program features that go beyond the minimum required. A good example
is the important case of time limits. Table 5.3 shows the limits adopted by
the states in the ﬁrst year after TANF. Only a slight majority of the states—
twenty-seven—have adopted the simple PRWORA standard of a sixty-
month lifetime time limit. The rest of the states have adopted some other
type of plan and, in fact, most of these states have adopted time limits that
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Table 5.3 State Time Limits, August 1998
States Time Limits
27 states 60 months
8 states Intermittent (e.g., 24 out of 60 months); lifetime of 60 months
8 states Less than 60 months lifetime
Arizona, Indiana 24 out of 60 months, lifetime of 60 for adults only; 60 months lifetime
California For applicants: 18 months but can be extended to 24 months if extension will
lead to employment or 60 months if no job available and adults participate in
community service. For recipients: 24 months but can be extended to 60 months
if no job available and adults participate in community service
Illinois No limit if family has earned income and works 20 hours per week; 24 months
for families with no child under age 13 and no earnings; 60 months for all other
families
Iowa Individualized; lifetime of 60 months
Massachusetts 24 out of 60 months; no lifetime limit
Michigan No time limit; will use state funds after 60 months
Texas 12, 24 and 36 months lifetime for adults only; time period depends on employ-
ability of head of household
Source: U.S. DHHS (1998).are stricter than those required by PRWORA, sometimes dramatically so.12
For example, eight states impose not only a lifetime limit but also a shorter
limit over ﬁxed calendar intervals (e.g., no more than twenty-four months
of receipt in every sixty months of calendar time). Eight other states simply
impose a shorter lifetime limit than sixty months; the shortest of these is
Connecticut, at twenty-one months, a very stringent limit. However, Ari-
zona illustrates a variation that many states have considered—a lifetime
limit only for adults, so that children can continue to receive beneﬁts be-
yond sixty months (paid for out of state funds). Six other states besides
Arizona have adopted these “reduction” rather than “termination” poli-
cies, which constitute a relaxing of the time limits implicit in PRWORA
(Gallagher et al. 1998, table 6).13The other six states in the table have more
complex provisions that introduce new criteria into the time limit imposed
and hence open the door to individual-speciﬁc considerations related to
need and job availability.
The states have also embraced work requirements and sanctions vigor-
ously. The most notable movement has been toward a “work ﬁrst” ap-
proach in which recipients and new applicants for beneﬁts are moved as
quickly as possible into work of any kind, with a deemphasis on education
and training. States have imposed strong sanctions for failure to comply
with these requirements, usually beginning with an initial partial sanction
at ﬁrst noncompliance and then graduating to a more severe, full sanction
at subsequent noncompliance. Seven states have imposed a lifetime ban on
eligibility if an adult receives a certain number of sanctions; in Georgia, for
example, two sanctions will trigger this prohibition. Many states have also
lowered the age of the youngest child that furnishes exemption from the re-
quirement to one year or six months and have otherwise tightened up on
exemptions from the regulations (Gallagher et al. 1998). The work re-
quirements have also been strengthened by frequent requirements for job
search and work registration at the point of application for TANF beneﬁts
that must be complied with before beneﬁt receipt can begin.
With the aim of reinforcing these work requirements, states have gener-
ally lowered their tax rates. Table 5.4shows state-by-state changes as of Oc-
tober 1997. Although ten states have kept the AFDC disregards (i.e., no
disregards beyond $90 after twelve months of beneﬁt receipt), the rest of
the states have lowered their tax rates considerably. Many states have a tax
rate of 50 percent, while there is a distribution above and below this value
as well. A few states have 100 percent disregards, implying a tax rate of
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12. However, the large states in the United States—who have a disproportionate share of
the caseload—do not have time limits below sixty months (and Michigan has none at all).
13. It is worth noting at this point that the PRWORA legislation imposes the limit only on
a family in which there is an adult caretaker who has been on welfare for sixty months, re-
gardless of how long the children have been supported. In principle, children could be put un-
der the care of a diﬀerent relative and be eligible for another sixty months of beneﬁts.304 Robert A. Moﬃtt
Table 5.4 Monthly Earnings Disregards in TANF as of October 1997





























Nevada 0 $90 or 20b
New Hampshire 0 50
New Mexico $150 50
New Jersey 0 50
New York 90 42
North Carolina AFDC AFDC





Rhode Island $170 50
South Carolina AFDC AFDC






Washington 0 50zero; these states limit beneﬁts by imposing income limits of one form or
another on eligibility (at which point the tax rate is eﬀectively greater than
100 percent).
States have altered some of the other ﬁnancial aspects of eligibility and
the beneﬁt formula but not all.14 Asset limits have generally been raised, as
have gross income limits, but beneﬁt levels themselves have for the most
part been left the same as they were prior to PRWORA (Gallagher et al.
1998). The 100-hour rule limiting work in two-parent families has been
dropped in the majority of states, although work requirements are now im-
posed on both parents in such families. Family caps have been adopted in
twenty-two states, and one state (Wisconsin) has adopted a ﬂat beneﬁt that
does not vary at all with family size. There has been signiﬁcant reduction
in the use of the child support pass-through (the requirement that the wel-
fare recipient receive the ﬁrst $50 of child support payment from the fa-
ther). Finally, the majority of states have adopted some type of “diversion”
program which seeks to divert families who have applied for TANF from
coming onto the rolls. One type provides a family with a lump-sum cash
payment together with a stipulation that they cannot reapply for a ﬁxed
number of months. Another provides families with child care, medical, or
transportation services to assist them in cases where they are judged to be
only temporarily needy. A third, common, program requires recipients to
engage in a speciﬁed period of job search, sometimes merely by registering
with a work agency but often requiring that the applicant show evidence of
having applied for jobs or having contacted employers. The individual can-
not be considered for assistance until the requirement is met.
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Table 5.4 (continued)
West Virginia 0 40 on average (varies)
Wisconsin 0 0
Wyoming $200–400 0
Source: Gallagher et al. (1998, table 14)
Notes: In cases where the disregards change with the length of the spell, those for the longest
spell are shown. AFDC = $90 ﬂat disregard and zero percent of remainder after twelve
months.
aDisregard is 100 percent as long as earnings are below poverty line; beneﬁt goes to zero
above.
bDisregard is $90 or 20 percent, whichever is greater.
cThere is an additional disregard that varies with earnings and family size.
dDisregard is 100 percent as long as net income is below poverty line; disregard is 0 if net in-
come is above poverty line but earnings are below poverty line; and beneﬁts go to zero if earn-
ings are above poverty line.
14. Details on state-speciﬁc beneﬁt formulas can be found in the Welfare Rules Database
of the Urban Institute (http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd).5.1.3 Goals of AFDC and TANF
The AFDC and TANF rules implicitly reveal many of the goals of the
programs as they have changed over time. Originally the AFDC program
was intended only to provide cash support for widows and their children,
at a time when married women were commonly expected not to work and
to stay at home to raise their children. Over time, as the general labor force
participation rate of women with children rose, and as the composition of
the caseload shifted toward divorced and unmarried mothers, the goals of
the program gradually shifted as well, toward encouraging and requiring
work to accompany the cash beneﬁt. This shift took a major additional
step with the state-level welfare reform eﬀorts in the early 1990s and with
the 1996 passage of PRWORA, whereby the goals of the program were
moved toward the employment goal much more strongly than had been the
case in the past.
Another signiﬁcant shift in goals in the 1990s has been the shift from an
education-training strategy toward a pure work strategy. There has been a
tension between these two strategies ever since the employment goal began
to enter into programmatic discussions in the late 1960s. The education-
training strategy, or what was sometimes called the human capital strategy,
aimed to improve recipient skills and potential wage rates in the labor mar-
ket, whereas the pure work strategy emphasized instead work per se, even
if the education or training content was not high. The education-training
strategy is more expensive and has an uncertain rate of return but holds the
promise of long-run improvement, whereas the pure work strategy is rela-
tively inexpensive and promotes employment directly but may do less for
long-run earnings capacity. The education-training, or human capital,
strategy was most forcefully embodied in the Family Support Act of 1988,
but the 1996 PRWORA strongly reoriented the strategy toward a pure
work goal.
But the PRWORA legislation represented more than simply a redirec-
tion of the employment goal and an increased emphasis on work. A new
goal appeared, which was to reduce “dependency,” a term much used in
public discussions, which is more or less deﬁned as long-term receipt of
welfare beneﬁts. Such dependency is presumed by the PRWORA legisla-
tion to have deleterious eﬀects on adults and children, a hypothesis upon
which research has a bearing. The time limits embodied in PRWORA are
intended to reduce dependency directly by simply disallowing long-term
receipt, thereby providing only temporary assistance to families. There is
also an implicit hypothesis in the notion of a time limit by which welfare re-
cipients are capable of becoming “self-suﬃcient” oﬀ the rolls, where “self-
suﬃciency” is meant as the attainment of a reasonable and sustainable
level of income that is enough to allow a family not to have to apply for
public support. The time limit provisions implicitly presume that it is pos-
306 Robert A. Moﬃttsible to become self-suﬃcient after ﬁve years or less of welfare receipt, an-
other hypothesis that is in principle possible to test.
Another new goal of welfare programs in the 1990s has been to reduce
the rate of nonmarital childbearing and to encourage marriage. This goal
is explicitly stated in the preamble to the PRWORA legislation, but the law
itself has very few provisions directly relating to it.15 In part this is because
it is presumed that reductions in dependency will lead to reductions in such
childbearing and an increase in marriage, another hypothesis that can be
subjected to test. The lack of direct provisions in PRWORA on childbear-
ing and marriage is also partly the result of a lack of conﬁdence by Con-
gress in the eﬃcacy of any speciﬁc set of programs directly aimed at those
outcomes.
5.2 Caseloads, Expenditures, Participation, and Recipient Characteristics
5.2.1 Expenditure, Caseload, and Beneﬁt Trends
The AFDC program experienced uneven growth of expenditures and
caseloads over its lifetime. Whereas program growth was essentially com-
parable to population growth from 1935 through the late 1950s, expendi-
tures and caseloads began to pick up in the 1960s. Figure 5.1 shows the
growth of real per capita expenditures in the AFDC program from 1970 to
1995.16 A notable increase in AFDC expenditures occurred in the early
1970s (a continuation of an upward trend that began in the late 1960s) and
ran through about 1977, a period known as the “welfare explosion.” Ex-
penditures subsequently declined in real terms, until the early 1990s, when
they underwent another period of growth, albeit much smaller in magni-
tude than that in the 1970s. This period of growth was not suﬃcient to
oﬀset the long-period decline, however, and by 1995 per capita expendi-
tures on the AFDC program were at about the same level they were in 1972.
The second line in ﬁgure 5.1 shows per capita expenditure trends in the
TANF program and for a reconstructed set of expenditures for the AFDC
program to restore some measure of comparability. The TANF program’s
expenditures cover many types of activities (e.g., jobs programs and emer-
gency assistance) that were not included in oﬃcial AFDC expenditures. As
the line shows, expenditures including these additional programs were
slightly higher than oﬃcial AFDC expenditures but have fallen rapidly in
the TANF program. This decline is largely a result of the decline in the
caseload, as discussed next.
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15. Of the four principal goals of the PRWORA legislation given in its preamble, only one
relates solely to assisting the poor; the other three relate to increasing marriage and employ-
ment and to reducing nonmarital childbearing.
16. This ﬁgure and all subsequent ones use the Personal Consumption Expenditure deﬂa-
tor (base 1996) for conversion to real amounts.The upper line in ﬁgure 5.2 shows the per capita caseload in the AFDC
and TANF programs. The AFDC caseload grew dramatically in the early
1970s (again, a continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s) and then
gradually declined until 1982 and leveled oﬀ for the rest of the decade. A
new surge of growth occurred in the early 1990s, followed by a decline that
began before 1996 but accelerated after it and led to a caseload level by
1999 that had fallen below its level in 1970. Overall, the pattern of caseload
growth generally follows the pattern of expenditures in ﬁgure 5.1. Indeed,
a decomposition of the per capita expenditure growth into caseload per
capita and expenditures per recipient through 1995 shows that the former
explains essentially all of the expenditure patterns (Moﬃtt 2001). The
same correlation appears after 1995. Expenditures per recipient changed
very little over the entire period.
The lower lines in ﬁgure 5.2 show trends in the fraction of single-mother
families who received AFDC or TANF beneﬁts, and trends in the fraction
of earnings-poor single-mother families who did so.17 Participation rates
grew rapidly in the 1970s and then declined somewhat through the early
1990s. Moﬃtt (2001) has shown that the fraction of the population that is
in single-mother families grew steadily over the period and accelerated
during the 1980s and early 1990s; this growth kept the caseload from
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Fig. 5.1 AFDC and TANF real expenditures per capita, 1970–99
Sources: U.S. DHHS (2001, table TANF 3); U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means
(2000, table 7-15); U.S. Department of Commerce (2000, table 2, Population).
17. Earnings-poor families are those below their poverty threshold on the basis of family
earnings alone. Only single-mother families are shown because married families have always
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Fig. 5.2 AFDC and TANF caseload per capita and participation rates per capita,
1970–99
Sources: U.S. DHHS (2001, table TANF 1); U.S. Department of Commerce (2000, table 2,
Population); author tabulations from the Current Population Survey.
falling even more than it did from the decline in participation rates of single
mothers alone. Indeed, the spike in the caseload in the early 1990s is not re-
ﬂected in participation rates and is instead a result of the continued growth
of single-mother families. Starting around 1994, participation rates de-
clined drastically along with the caseload. The caseload decline was en-
tirely the result of the drop in participation, for, at least through 1999, there
was no dropoﬀ in the number of single mother families (U.S. DHHS 2001,
pp. III–50).18
Figure 5.3 shows trends in real welfare beneﬁts for a family of four over
the 1970–98 period.19 The lower line in the ﬁgure shows trends for AFDC-
TANF, while the upper two lines show ﬁgures for the combined sum of
AFDC-TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid. The higher of the two latter
lines shows the straight sum of the three, and the lower of the two discounts
the Medicaid beneﬁt by an estimate of its cash-equivalent value and also
takes into account the taxation of AFDC-TANF income by the Food
Stamp Program.
The ﬁgure shows that AFDC-TANF beneﬁts by themselves have de-
clined secularly since 1970, and hence cannot provide an explanation for
18. The decline in participation was not a result of increases in income that made more
single mothers ineligible. The decline in the participation rate of poor single mothers in ﬁgure
5.2 suggests this, but when income eligibility is more precisely determined, the data show a de-
cline in the participation rate of income-eligible families as well (U.S. DHHS 2001, pp. II–21).
19. The ﬁgures show the maximum amount paid for a family with no other income, or what
economists commonly call the guarantee.any of the positive or negative ﬂuctuations in the caseload or in participa-
tion rates conditional on single motherhood shown in ﬁgure 5.2. Mechan-
ically, the decline in beneﬁts results from a failure of states to raise nomi-
nal beneﬁt levels to keep up with inﬂation. There has been very little change
in this trend during the TANF program, although the beneﬁt decline has
slightly leveled oﬀ.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that food stamps and Medicaid
were not received by many families in the late 1960s and came into their
own only in the early 1970s, when they rapidly expanded around the coun-
try. Recipients of AFDC were automatically eligible for beneﬁts from both
programs (as TANF recipients continue to be). Consequently, a proper
comparison of the change in beneﬁts received by AFDC recipients is more
closely approximated by comparing the AFDC beneﬁt alone in 1970 to the
combined beneﬁt in 1975 and after. By that comparison, there was a strong
growth of beneﬁts in the early 1970s, thus providing a possible explanation
for the growth in the caseload and in participation rates over that period.
Moreover, the decline in the combined beneﬁt subsequently has been en-
tirely the result of the decline in AFDC beneﬁts, for food stamp beneﬁts
have remained relatively constant in real terms and real Medicaid beneﬁts
have grown slightly. On net, by 1998, the combined beneﬁt was still higher
than the AFDC beneﬁt alone in 1970.
The AFDC-TANF beneﬁt decline after 1996 is also somewhat mislead-
ing because of the increase in the fraction of TANF expenditures spent on
noncash services. Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of 1999 TANF expen-
ditures by spending category and shows that only 59 percent of monies
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Fig. 5.3 Real monthly AFDC-TANF, food stamp, and Medicaid beneﬁts, 1970–98
Source: Welfare beneﬁts data ﬁle, [http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Moﬃtt/DataSets.html].The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program 311
Fig. 5.4 TANF expenditures by spending category, FY 1999
Source: U.S. DHHS (2000, chart 2.4).
were expended on cash aid. The rest was spent on work activities, child
care, administration, and a number of other categories (including social
services). Indeed, when the post-TANF expenditures in ﬁgure 5.1 are di-
vided by the number of cash recipients shown in ﬁgure 5.2, it can easily be
seen that expenditures per recipient have actually increased after 1996,
rather than fallen. In large part this is simply because the caseload has de-
clined so drastically that states have used their block grant monies for
other, noncash categories.20
5.2.2 Recipient Characteristics
Table 5.5 shows the trends in a few characteristics of the AFDC and
TANF caseload 1969 to 1999. The percent of the caseload with earnings
was only 13 percent in 1979 but dropped further in the 1980s, largely be-
cause of 1981 federal legislation that increased the tax rate on earnings to
100 percent (see table 5.1), eﬀectively making many working families for-
merly on AFDC ineligible for beneﬁts. The percent with earnings is a much
higher 25 percent by 1999, a reﬂection of the emphasis of current welfare
reform on work.
The age of recipients appears to be slightly increasing and family size is
declining, although most of this decline occurred in the 1970s. The fraction
20. There are unfortunately no concrete data on how many of the recipients of the noncash
expenditures are AFDC-TANF recipients and how many are either former recipients—
namely, those who have left the welfare rolls—or even poor families who have never been on
AFDC-TANF. This makes the expenditure per recipient calculation potentially misleading,
for the monies are now spread over a large population. Along with the decline in expenditures
has probably been a redistribution within the poor population.whose youngest child is less than two has also decline in the 1990s, either
because of a general decline in the population of families with children in
this age range or because mothers with very young children have left the
welfare rolls. Another important trend has been an enormous increase in
the 1990s in the fraction of the caseload composed of child-only cases.
These are cases in which beneﬁts are received by children but the parent, or
other adult caretaker, is herself ineligible for beneﬁts. Such ineligibility can
occur if the parent is a noncitizen immigrant but the children are citizens;
if the children are cared for by a nonparent with income above the TANF
eligibility level; or if the parent has been sanctioned for violating one of
many TANF rules (including those for work requirements) or has reached
a TANF time limit and has gone oﬀthe rolls. The last category occurs only
in those states with partial sanctions—that is, in the case of a violation only
the portion of the beneﬁt designated for the adult is terminated—and in
those states where the time limit is applied only to the adult, not to the chil-
dren. In child-only families, none of the work requirements or time limits
aﬀect beneﬁts or eligibility because they are assessed only on adults.
The last row of the table shows trends in the fraction of the caseload
without a high school education. This fraction declined secularly, as it did
for the population as a whole from rising levels of education. However, it
has increased slightly since 1996, possibly a sign that more educated recip-
ients have left the rolls in the massive caseload decline illustrated earlier.
This would leave the caseload more disadvantaged than it had been be-
fore.21
The types of single mothers on AFDC also shifted over time, as shown
in ﬁgure 5.5. Initially most single mothers were widows, but in the 1960s
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Table 5.5 Selected Characteristics of AFDC and TANF Families, 1969–99
1969 1979 1988 1999
% with earnings — 12.8 8.4 25.2
age (median) — — 29.0 31.2
% with less than high school education 76.7 57.8 47.2 48.9
Family size 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.8
% whose youngest child is less than two — — 43.1 32.3
% child-only families 10.1 14.6 9.6 29.1
Sources: First, fourth, and sixth rows: U.S. DHHS (2001, table TANF 7). Second and ﬁfth
rows: Oellerich (2001, table 3). Third row: for 1969, 1979, and 1988, U.S. Congress, Commit-
tee on Ways and Means (1998, table 7-19); for 1999, U.S. DHHS (1999, table 17); ﬁgures
shown here represent the originals inﬂated by the fraction nonmissing.
Note: Dashes indicate data not available.
21. The evidence on whether this type of selectivity has occurred is weaker than one would
predict. See Moﬃtt and Stevens (2001), Moﬃtt et al. (2001), and Smith (2001), and the refer-
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Fig. 5.5 Basis of AFDC eligibility, 1942–94
Source: U.S. DHHS (1995, 63).
and 1970s the majority were divorced and separated women. In the 1980s
and 1990s, the majority were unmarried single mothers. These trends have
contributed importantly to the perception of welfare recipients by the gen-
eral public and have probably increased its unpopularity.22
5.3 Research on the AFDC Program
This section reviews the research literature on the AFDC program. The
AFDC program has received more research attention from economists
than any other welfare program. It was the best-known cash means-tested
program in the mind of the general public and policymakers. Its beneﬁt
structure was also fairly simple and came closest, among all means-tested
programs, to the simple textbook model of such a program with a single
guarantee and a single tax rate on income. This made it particularly well
suited to the study of work incentives, which has always been the main in-
terest of economists, beginning with the discussions of a negative income
in the 1960s.
Research on the TANF program is considered later in a separate sec-
tion.23 There is much less research on TANF, and, further, the character
of that research is generally quite diﬀerent from that on the AFDC pro-
22. For a study of how the general public perceives welfare recipients, and how that per-
ception is aﬀected by the marital status of recipients, see Moﬃtt (1999b).
23. That section includes research on the AFDC waivers of the 1990s because those
waivers, while conducted within the AFDC program, are best understood as precursors to
TANF.gram, as will be seen from the review. Nevertheless, research on AFDC is
still quite relevant to the TANF program because academic AFDC re-
search deals, by and large, with fundamental response issues—the eﬀects
of beneﬁts and tax rates on behavior—and not with the eﬀects of speciﬁc
subfeatures of AFDC, which are not so generalizable. Consequently,
AFDC research is still relevant in the TANF era, albeit in a generalized
sense.
Although the issue of work incentives is by far the major area in which
AFDC research has been conducted, some studies have also been con-
ducted on many other issues as well. The review below will include the
main areas of such research: dynamics and turnover in the program; em-
ployment and training programs; eﬀects of the program on demographic
and family outcomes; and research on the state determination of beneﬁts.
The sections below on each of these topics will ﬁrst consider the economic




Economists’ research on AFDC, as on most welfare programs, generally
has taken the redistributive goals of the program as given and has tended
to focus on the behavioral incentives and disincentives provided by the pro-
gram structure and beneﬁt formula. For work incentives, there is a well-
developed model for analyzing these incentives—the static labor supply
model—which has been the workhorse of this literature. The model has en-
dured because it can capture the simple labor supply eﬀects of a wide range
of elementary program alternatives.
The model is illustrated with the familiar income-leisure diagram in ﬁg-
ure 5.6, where the nontransfer constraint is shown as ADE with slope –W
(the hourly wage rate) and it is assumed that there is no nonprogram non-
labor income (N). The beneﬁt formula (allowing positive N) is B   G –
t(WH   N), where H is hours of work, generating the transfer constraint
shown as ACD, with slope –W(1 – t). Here t is the marginal tax rate on
beneﬁts and the intercept G is the guarantee level. The introduction of the
program where there was none before uncontrovertibly reduces (or at least
does not increase) labor supply because income and substitution eﬀects
go in the same direction. Those initially on constraint AD will move to
CD, reducing labor supply, and a few of those initially above point D will
reduce labor supply to go onto the program (indiﬀerence curves not
shown).
An increase in G, which shifts segment CD up in parallel fashion, re-
duces hours of work in this model if leisure is a normal good, but the more
314 Robert A. Moﬃttimportant comparative static is that induced by a reduction in t. The
negative income tax, a program originally proposed by Friedman (1962)
and promoted by Lampman (1968), Tobin (1966), Tobin, Pechman, and
Mieszkowski (1967), and many others thereafter, was intended to provide
work incentives by such a reform. Figure 5.7shows the eﬀect of a reduction
in t from 1.0 to some lesser value by the shift from CD to CD . It is now a
well-known result that the eﬀect of such a reduction on average hours of
work is ambiguous in sign. While some of those who are initially on wel-
fare and not working increase their hours of work (arrow 1), those in the
newly created eligible region will reduce their labor supply (arrow 2), as will
some of those at higher income levels who are initially ineligible (arrow 3).
Whether labor supply on net increases or decreases depends on the relative
numbers of individuals at diﬀerent points and on the magnitudes of their
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Fig. 5.6 Budget constraint with a means-tested transfer program
Fig. 5.7 Eﬀect of change on t on labor supplyresponses.24The ranges of Gand tin the AFDC program typically resulted
in a program breakeven point (D or D ) somewhere in the part-time hours
range, so the eﬀect of a reduction in t was thought to increase part-time
work both by pulling nonworkers up to that range and inducing some full-
time workers to reduce work to part time (to obtain beneﬁt supplementa-
tion).
This result is a special case of a larger principle that has bedeviled wel-
fare reform, namely, that any reform that provides a beneﬁt to those on wel-
fare that is not available oﬀ welfare tends to draw families onto the pro-
gram, thereby increasing the caseload and decreasing labor supply.
Providing beneﬁt supplementation to those who work while on welfare—
but not to those who are oﬀ welfare—is one example, but so is providing
medical beneﬁts, child care subsidies, and education and training pro-
grams, if those are provided only to those on welfare and not those oﬀ.
There is no way within this general class of budget-constraint manipula-
tions of the welfare formula to avoid these eﬀects entirely, although they
may be avoided by making such beneﬁts universal and hence available to
those oﬀ welfare as well as on.
With a minor modiﬁcation, the model also provides a simple theory of
welfare participation, which is also a useful tool in analyzing the AFDC
program. Denoting V(W , N ) as the indirect utility obtained by an indi-
vidual on a linear budget segment with slope W  and rightmost intercept
N , we can write the determinants of welfare participation—P, equal to 1
if the individual participates and 0 if not—as
(1) P∗   V[W(1   t), N(1   t)   G]   V[W, N]   C
(2) P   1 iﬀ P∗   0; P   0 otherwise
where C is some implicit cost attached to being a welfare recipient. That
cost may be a stigma cost—the individual suﬀers a utility loss from being
on welfare per se—or a time and money cost arising from the process of
applying for the program and complying with its ongoing reporting and
other requirements. The ﬁrst two terms in equation (1) imply that partici-
pation propensities are increasing in G and decreasing in t, and there is a
presumption (although not strictly required by theory) that they are de-
creasing in W. The basic trade-oﬀ in the model faced in the participation
choice is between the potential beneﬁt, on the one hand, and potential
earnings oﬀ welfare, on the other. Welfare costs (C) are needed to explain
why participation rates of eligibles are less than 100 percent—as all data
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24. The decrease in t has ambiguous eﬀects on work eﬀort but unambiguously increases the
caseload and the participation rate in the program. The early literature on reductions in t(e.g.,
Aaron 1973) emphasized that there is a trade-oﬀ between work incentives and program costs
for this reason. But, in fact, the trade-oﬀ is more unfavorable than this implies because a re-
duction in t may not only increase costs, it may also not increase labor supply.calculations show them to be—for this implies that some families will be
observed to be on segment AD in ﬁgure 5.1 and do not take advantage of
a potential increase in income by going onto welfare. Note that equations
(1)–(2) also cover the participation choice between locating above the
break-even point D in ﬁgure 5.1 and below it, as well as the choice between
segment AD and CD.
Evidence
There have been three major reviews of the literature on the eﬀect of
AFDC on labor supply (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Moﬃtt
1992b; Hoynes 1997), which cover most of the work on that topic. The
studies as a whole conﬁrm that AFDC reduces labor supply, and the esti-
mates of its eﬀect range from 10 to 50 percent of non-AFDC levels. Mean
labor supply in the absence of AFDC is generally only about twenty hours
per week, however (including nonworkers), so the absolute magnitude of
the reduction is not as large as might be expected.25 Probably the major
methodological problem with these estimates is the obvious one that they
are not based on any data in which AFDC was literally absent, but rather
are extrapolations from estimated eﬀects of the existing, positive level of
AFDC beneﬁts down to a beneﬁt level of zero. Beneﬁt-level estimates (re-
ally, eﬀects of G) are obtained from cross-state variation in beneﬁts, which,
although large, does not include zero beneﬁts. These estimates must there-
fore be treated with some caution.
This literature also generally estimates income and substitution eﬀects
on labor supply, usually based, at least in part, on variation in G and t
across states. This itself is also problematic because, while there was con-
siderable variation in G in the AFDC program, as just noted, the nominal
level of the tax rate was set by the federal government and hence was con-
stant across states. Sometimes this problem was circumvented by con-
straining the eﬀect of t to enter the labor supply function through W(1 – t),
thereby allowing wage variation to identify the coeﬃcient, but often varia-
tion in eﬀective tax rates arising from a variety of sources was used.26 Ei-
ther approach has problems. In any case, however, the elasticities estimated
in the papers generally fell into acceptable ranges as those are deﬁned
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program 317
25. The estimates suﬀer from a data problem, namely, that they use household surveys that
only contain information on hours of work over an entire year (divided by 52), which includes
both welfare and nonwelfare weeks. Thus the estimates are themselves some average over
weeks in which the individual was on welfare and weeks in which she was not.
26. See note 2 for ways in which states could manipulate the tax rate. These variations only
changed the tax rate over some ranges of the data and hence still require some parametric re-
strictions to obtain general estimates of substitution eﬀects. Some studies, rather than using
the oﬃcial manipulations of the tax rate, simply used estimated eﬀective tax rates obtained by
regressing beneﬁts on income on a state-by-state basis (see Fraker, Moﬃtt, and Wolf 1985,
and McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith 1999 for such estimates). However, these incorrectly lin-
earized the beneﬁt formula and also incorporated taxes and work-related expenses that
should not be included.by the general labor supply literature for women and single mothers, with
moderately large and negative income eﬀects and moderately sized and
positive uncompensated substitution eﬀects.
However, as noted in the Models section above, the net eﬀect of changes
in t on labor supply depends on the relative magnitudes of oﬀsetting posi-
tive and negative eﬀects, regardless of whether uncompensated substitu-
tion eﬀects are positive. On this issue, the evidence suggested that the net
eﬀect was reasonably close to zero; that is, that the positive and negative in-
centive eﬀects of changes in t essentially cancel each other out. The non-
experimental evidence, such as that provided by simulations from nonex-
perimental labor supply elasticities, demonstrates this, as does evidence
from the NIT experiments. In the latter, comparisons of labor supply
across alternative treatment groups that had the same G but diﬀerent t
showed no consistent evidence of diﬀerences in hours of work (SRI Inter-
national 1983, table 3.9). As noted by Moﬃtt (1992b), the ﬁnding of a small
or nonexistent eﬀect of changes in t on labor supply is consistent with the
relative invariance of hours of work among female heads in time series be-
fore and after the 1967 and 1981 changes in the tax rate in the AFDC pro-
gram.
There have been relatively few new studies of AFDC and labor supply
since the past reviews. Three are noted in table 5.6. Hoynes (1996) studied
the AFDC-UP program and found it to have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on
the labor supply of husbands and wives, but that marginal reductions in t
had little eﬀect, consistent with prior work. Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) fo-
cused on the labor supply eﬀects of participating in multiple programs, in-
cluding not only AFDC but also food stamps, subsidized housing, and the
Medicaid program. They showed that cumulative marginal tax rates were
generally greater than 100 percent in this case. Nevertheless, although their
estimated substitution and income elasticities were sizable, the net eﬀect on
labor supply of reducing the marginal tax rates to a level below 100 percent
was negligible, again for the same reasons already noted. Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001) focused on an attempt to explain the increase in em-
ployment rates among single mothers from 1984 to 1986. They found that
AFDC beneﬁts and tax rates (the latter aﬀecting potential beneﬁts if work-
ing) had expected eﬀects on employment probabilities, but that the time se-
ries increase in single-mother employment was less aﬀected by changes in
those parameters and other welfare variables than by a change in the gen-
erosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) over the period (see the
EITC chapter in this volume).27
Simple static models of participation in AFDC also form a part of this
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27. Because Meyer and Rosenbaum examined employment rather than hours of work, the
“perverse” eﬀect of a change in t could not occur. They brieﬂy examined eﬀects on hours of
work as a sensitivity test, but they noted that the model independent variables were not set up
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tliterature, generally estimating some version of equations (1)–(2). Again,
most of this literature is summarized by prior reviews. The studies over-
whelmingly conﬁrm that participation propensities are positively aﬀected
by Gand negatively aﬀected by t, and generally conﬁrm that those propen-
sities are negatively aﬀected by Wand N. Two of the recent studies (Hoynes
1996 and Keane and Moﬃtt 1998) estimated participation equations
jointly with labor supply equations and obtained results consistent with
these ﬁndings.
Researchers have also sought to use this model to explain the time-series
pattern of caseload and participation rates in diﬀerent periods shown in
Figure 2. Most explanations for the welfare caseload increase in the late
1960s and early 1970s rely on the gradual expansions of the Food Stamp
and Medicaid programs to more counties in the United States, which,
given the ties of these programs to AFDC receipt, made the program more
attractive. Such an explanation is consistent with the economic model.
However, most observers attribute part of the increase as well to court de-
cisions relaxing eligibility restrictions and to declines in welfare stigma, al-
though the latter may be endogenous. The relatively stable caseload trend
in the late 1970s and 1980s is generally attributed to two oﬀsetting and con-
tradictory forces, one an increase in the fraction of single mother families
in the population and the other a decline in the participation rate condi-
tional on single motherhood. The latter is most often attributed to the de-
cline in the real beneﬁt level, while the causes of the former are still in con-
siderable dispute. The economic model is better at explaining changes in
participation conditional on single motherhood than changes in single
motherhood, in general. Finally, the increase in caseloads in the early
1990s, which resulted from a rise in the participation rate conditional on
single motherhood more than a rise in single motherhood, is more diﬃcult
to explain with the economic model, for neither declining wage rates nor
increasing beneﬁts can be reasonably tied to most of the growth. Blank
(2001) shows that the majority of the caseload increase over this period
arose from increases in child-only cases and the AFDC-UP caseload, nei-
ther of which is easily explainable by the economic model, whereas the re-
maining growth of the traditional single-mother AFDC caseload is rea-
sonably well explained by an expanded model that includes not only
beneﬁts but also demographics, political factors, and other policy vari-
ables.28
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28. Blank also argues, however, that the growth of the single-mother AFDC caseload over
this period was more a result of an increase in the number of single mothers with income be-
low the eligibility level than of an increase in take-up conditional on this eligibility. Moﬃtt
(2001) showed that the caseload increase over this period was half a result of increases in the
numbers of single mothers and half a result of increases in take-up conditional on single
motherhood (but not conditional on income). Moﬃtt also argued that, over the period 1971–
95, participation rates so deﬁned ﬂuctuated around a constant mean and hence had no eﬀect
on the long-run growth of the caseload, which is instead essentially entirely explained by the
growth in single motherhood.A small literature has also developed on the concept of welfare stigma,
which, as mentioned above, is conceived of as a disutility of welfare partic-
ipation which lowers participation rates in the program. Moﬃtt (1983) in-
troduced the concept to the literature but considered it to be an exogenous
heterogeneous parameter of the individual utility function that could be
used to rationalize the need to estimate a participation equation and not
just a labor supply equation.29 However, other studies have developed the
idea of welfare stigma as a disutility that declines with the number of other
families who are on welfare, setting up a social interactions, or contagion,
model that can have multiplier eﬀects once participation rates exceed a
threshold. Besley and Coate (1992a), for example, assumed that the utility
of being on welfare is reduced by some function of the fraction of the pop-
ulation that is not truly needy and is instead reducing labor supply to go
onto welfare. Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) simply assumed that
the utility of being on welfare is reduced by the number of others who are
on welfare, but they went on to analyze the voting equilibria that would set
beneﬁt levels that would generate diﬀerent welfare caseloads as an equilib-
rium outcome. In a somewhat diﬀerent vein, Nechyba (2001) assumed that
the stigma of having nonmarital births (which is a condition for welfare el-
igibility) is reduced by the magnitude of the aggregate nonmarital birth
rate, and he then showed that a change in welfare beneﬁts can initiate a
nontrivial change in that birth rate through multiplier eﬀects.
5.3.2 Participation Dynamics
A continuing area of research on the AFDC program focuses on partic-
ipation dynamics, that is, the study of entry rates, exit rates, and spell dis-
tributions of time on AFDC. Interest in this issue arises from several
sources. One is the recognition that, contrary to the impression given by
the static labor supply model where participation seems to be a one-time,
permanent decision, turnover rates in the AFDC program are quite high.
Another is that attitudes toward the program, and policy measures to as-
sist recipients, may diﬀer depending upon whether recipients have only
short spells of AFDC receipt or long spells. Short-spell recipients are likely
to be those with stronger labor market skills who use the program for tem-
porary support, whereas long-term recipients are likely to be those with the
weakest skills. Further, long-term receipt may reduce skill levels further, as
time out of the labor force results in deterioration of skills.
Models
The two building blocks of dynamic participation analysis are an entry
rate and an exit rate. The standard static labor supply–participation model
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29. If participation rates of eligibles are 100 percent, then all individuals are on the bound-
ary of their constraints, and their observed values of labor supply uniquely determine their
welfare participation status; hence there is no need to estimate a welfare participation equa-
tion.is easily adapted to entry and exit in order to generate a conventional eco-
nomic model of turnover. Supposing that the relevant population of eligi-
bles is composed of myopic individuals who make decisions only on the ba-
sis of current period values, the decision for women who are oﬀ welfare at
time   – 1 to enter or not enter the program (designate EN  as an entry
dummy variable) and the decision for women who are on welfare at time
  – 1 to exit or not exit the program (designate EX  as an exit dummy) can
be formulated as 
(3) EN  ∗   V[W  (1   t), N (1   t)   G]   V[W  , N ]   C   F1
(4) EN    1 iﬀ EN  ∗   0; EN    0 otherwise
(5) EX  ∗   V[W  , N ]   V[W  (1   t), N (1   t)   ]   C   F2
(6) EX    1 iﬀ EX ∗   0; EX    0 otherwise,
where F1 are ﬁxed costs associated with moving onto welfare and F2 are
ﬁxed costs associated with moving oﬀ welfare (and possibly into the work-
force). Starting with initial positions on or oﬀ welfare, and with G, t, and
C ﬁxed, transitions on and oﬀ welfare are driven by ﬂuctuations in private
market income opportunities W  and N , which are assumed to follow some
stochastic process. Individuals leave welfare when good job or other in-
come opportunities arise and enter welfare when those job or income cir-
cumstances deteriorate; beneﬁt levels and tax rates aﬀect the relative at-
tractiveness of welfare in the decision.
Given that the utility structure of the entry and exit decisions in equa-
tions (3)–(6) is the same as that in equation (1), the same comparative stat-
ics apply: Entry rates are increasing in G and decreasing in t and W, while
exit rates are decreasing in G and increasing in t and W. Since labor supply
on welfare is always less than labor supply oﬀ welfare, we can also say that
these entry and exit decisions operate to make labor supply decreasing in
G and increasing in t and W. That work incentives are implied to increase
in t reﬂects the adverse work incentive eﬀects noted above and can be seen
in a dynamic context to operate through entry and exit: Decreases in mar-
ginal tax rates tend to decrease exit from the rolls and increase entry onto
the rolls. Although the ﬁxed costs reduce transition rates, an individual’s
participation will tend to gradually move over time toward welfare if equa-
tion (3) is more positive than equation (5) conditional on W   and N  and to-
ward nonwelfare if the opposite occurs.
If   is the entry probability,   is the exit probability, and p   is the proba-
bility of being on welfare at time  , then we have the ﬂow identity
(7) p     (1   p  1)   (1    )p  1
   (1      )p  1
which approaches the equilibrium value





Thus participation on welfare will be more likely if   is greater than  , and
nonwelfare participation will be more likely if   is greater than  . Unless
the ﬁxed costs are large relative to the utility diﬀerences, these participa-
tion tendencies will be driven by the relative values of G, t, W, and N, as
before.
In this simple setup, short-term recipients can be thought of as those
with higher values of mean W  and N , which will generate lower entry rates,
higher exit rates, and shorter spell lengths, and long-term recipients can be
thought of as those with lower mean values of those variables, resulting in
higher entry rates, lower exit rates, and longer spell lengths. A logical al-
ternative in this model is that short-termers and long-termers have the
same means for wages and nonlabor income, but short-termers have a
higher variance, which will lead them to have higher turnover rates as well.
If the variation in wage and nonlabor income from period to period, which
generates turnover in this model, is not exogenous but rather depends on
eﬀort, then it is also possible that short-termers are those who put more
eﬀort into job search. Heterogeneity in the distaste for welfare can also
generate diﬀerences in turnover rates, as those with greater distaste have a
lower reservation wage for going oﬀ or failing to enter welfare.
These models can be made more realistic by allowing foresight, particu-
larly if wage growth is made endogenous and allowed to be aﬀected by
whether the individual is on or oﬀwelfare. Current entry and exit decisions
will then be aﬀected by expectations of the future consequences for wages
and labor market opportunities. Liquidity constraints are important be-
cause those going onto welfare may be those who are more greatly con-
strained and who cannot sustain themselves oﬀ welfare after a negative
wage shock, and those on welfare may be discouraged from saving by the
asset tests in the program (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995).
Evidence
The empirical literature on participation dynamics has two strands, one
consisting of simple descriptive work on the distribution of AFDC spells
in the population and of what types of individual characteristics are asso-
ciated with that distribution, and another consisting of estimates of entry
and exit rate equations. The most inﬂuential descriptive work in the litera-
ture is that of Bane and Ellwood (1983, 1994) and Ellwood (1986), who
used panel data to estimate distributions of AFDC spell lengths and also
distributions of “total time on” AFDC in a ﬁxed calendar interval. These
authors realized upon examination of the data not only that turnover rates
were high but that many of those who exited the AFDC rolls returned in
fairly short order, a ﬁnding that has been repeatedly found in subsequent
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program 323work. This implies that many women do not have many long spells but nev-
ertheless accumulate a considerable amount of time on welfare because of
their high return rates. Consequently, they may have a high total time on
welfare even though they do not have long spells. The data used by Bane
and Ellwood indicated that up to one-quarter of all (new) recipients would
be on AFDC for more than ten years in the subsequent twenty-ﬁve-year
period, as compared to only 10 percent who would have a spell that lasted
that long.30
In their later work (Bane and Ellwood 1994), the authors took the exis-
tence of high reentry rates to extend the categorization of welfare recipi-
ents to a threefold classiﬁcation, consisting of long-termers, short-termers,
and “cyclers.” Long-termers have long spells, short-termers have only brief
periods of AFDC receipt, and cyclers have relatively short spells but return
to the rolls frequently. The authors argued that policy toward the three
groups should be diﬀerent. In a recent paper, Moﬃtt (2002) has provided
evidence, however, that cyclers do not appear to have greater labor market
skills than long-termers, which is an implication of the conventional eco-
nomic model, where high turnover is generated by higher labor market
skill. Moﬃtt found that the education and wage rates of cyclers were equal
to those of long-termers, if not lower, and that they are a very disadvan-
taged group of recipients. This suggests that their cycling on and oﬀfor the
rolls must be arising from some other kind of behavior, such as an inability
to comply with program rules.
The literature on estimating entry and exit equations is fairly large and
is well summarized, for the most part, by the previous reviews of research
on AFDC referred to earlier. Table 5.7 lists some of the more recent stud-
ies that have been conducted, which explore a variety of issues. On the is-
sue of whether AFDC beneﬁts aﬀect the probability of entry and exit, the
literature conﬁrms prior work that the guarantee generally decreases exit
and increases reentry. None of the studies estimated the eﬀects of the tax
rate. Blank and Ruggles (1994) emphasized the high rates of reentry in the
program, and Blank and Ruggles (1996) emphasized that spells of eligibil-
ity are not the same as spells of welfare receipt, and some women enter the
rolls after being eligible for some time and others leave the rolls and remain
eligible, usually for unknown reasons. Fitzgerald (1995) and Hoynes (2000)
examined the eﬀects of local labor market conditions on exit rates, while
Harris (1993, 1996) examined the “routes” to exit from the rolls and reen-
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30. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services now routinely publishes these to-
tal time on ﬁgures. A recent report (U.S. DHHS 2001, table IND 10) shows that, in a period
later than Bane and Ellwood considered and for the total recipient population (not just those
with a new spell), one-quarter of recipients were on AFDC more than ﬁve years in a ten-year
period, a much higher rate of dependence. Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) examined how to-
tal-time-on had been trending, however, and found no trend from the 1970s to the 1980s. They
also proposed an alternative measure, which was the percentage of income received from


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































stry to it. The literature on “routes” was initiated to a large extent by Bane
and Ellwood (1983), who found that most exits from AFDC were to mar-
riage. Harris (1993, 1996) and others found that this was a result of using
annual data and that when monthly data are used, exits are usually to work.
The literature on these routes on and oﬀ welfare and reasons for exit are
frought with conceptual problems, for the immediate reasons for entry and
exit may not be the long-run reasons. In addition, reasons that particular
individuals enter and exit are endogenous to their unobserved characteris-
tics, and it is diﬃcult, as a result, to draw any implications about whether
government policy should be to encourage certain routes oﬀ welfare.31
5.3.3 Employment Programs
In addition to simply providing cash with a speciﬁed beneﬁt formula, the
AFDC program long conducted various types of employment programs for
recipients. One type was an education or training program that attempted
to provide labor market skills and hence to improve the wage rate of the
recipient. In policy discussions, these programs are often termed “human
capital” programs. A second type provided assistance in job search, or as-
sisted recipients in locating transportation and child care for employment,
or even instructed recipients on the kinds of behavior and dress needed at
regular jobs. In policy discussions, these are generally not termed human
capital programs, but economists’ conception of human capital should in-
clude them because there is some type of investment, or instruction, in-
volved, which has a future return, however small and short-lived that return
might be. A third type was a pure workfare program that simply required
ar ecipient to work some minimum number of hours per week, without the
assistance or other guidance from the welfare department (except, in the
case of public service employment, to actually provide the job). Such a pro-
gram should not be expected to aﬀect the wage rate and is not a human cap-
ital program under any deﬁnition. Most programs had at least some ele-
ments of two or more of these ideal types, and it is not always easy to ﬁnd
any of the types in pure form. Nevertheless, prior to TANF and the pre-
PRWORA waiver programs, AFDC employment programs typically drew
mostly on elements from the ﬁrst two of these program types, even though
variations on the third were present to some degree.
Models
These programs, when viewed as human capital programs that require
an investment of time (in education, training, job search, etc.) and yield
some rate of return in the form of a higher future wage, can be simply ana-
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31. In a review of the earlier literature in this subarea (Moﬃtt 1992b, 26), I noted that the
studies needed more theoretical structure and content. This observation would seem still to
hold.lyzed with the standard investment framework familiar from human capi-
tal theory.32 The value to an individual of participating in the program is
the present value of future wage and earnings gains minus the present value
of the time costs and, if any, money costs. Here it is important to know
whether the program is voluntary or mandatory. If it is voluntary, no re-
cipient will participate in the program unless its net present value is posi-
tive, but if it is mandatory, then it is conceivable that the net present value
will be negative for some recipients. If so, this will reduce the value of be-
ing on welfare and should be subtracted from the welfare beneﬁt itself (or
the present value of such beneﬁts) to obtain the value of being on welfare.
There are a number of minor alterations in this familiar model that
change things slightly but not in the main. Future gains in earnings must
be multiplied by the probability of employment if the latter is less than one,
and programs that change only that probability and not wages also have a
potentially positive net present value. Second, the rate of return will de-
pend on whether earnings are raised suﬃciently to induce the individual to
go oﬀ welfare altogether; if so, incremental earnings gains go untaxed (by
the welfare department), but if not, earnings gains will be taxed at the wel-
fare tax rate t and hence will be reduced. The rhetoric of most education
and training programs is that they are intended to move recipients oﬀ wel-
fare altogether, but the reality is otherwise (see empirical review). The
phrase “welfare trap” is sometimes used to describe a situation in which a
very large rate of return is needed to make the recipient ﬁnancially better
oﬀ oﬀ welfare—this is particularly likely to occur if there is a notch at the
point of going oﬀ welfare where tax rates are over 100 percent. Third, if
there are opportunity costs in the form of forgone earnings—as in the clas-
sic education case of human capital—these forgone earnings will only be
W(1 – t), not W, and hence will be lower than they would be for such in-
vestment oﬀ welfare.33 If the recipient is not working, there is forgone
leisure rather than forgone earnings but the former is not taxed.
Assuming that the opportunity cost is in earnings rather than leisure, the
net present value of the program in a two-period model can be written as




  {P 2[(W 2   W 1)(1   t)H2] 
  (1   P 2)[(W 2   W 1)H2   (G   tW 1H2)]}
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32. Although traditional human capital theory presumes the eﬀect of investment to aﬀect
the wage rate, a generalized interpretation would allow it to aﬀect employment as well. For
example, an investment in teaching a recipient improved job search techniques may lead to a
better ability of the recipient to ﬁnd a job at all, which would aﬀect hours of work and not the
wage rate. Although the theoretical discussion here assumes it is the wage rate that is aﬀected,
the same model can be extended to include eﬀects on hours of work.
33. This point was made long ago by Kesselman (1976). The theoretical literature on the
eﬀect of transfer programs on human capital investment is virtually nonexistent. See Kessel-
man and Miller and Sanders (1997).where W 1 is the wage if the recipient does not undergo the program, W 2 is
the (higher) wage in period two if she does, Iis the amount of time required
in period one, H2 is hours worked in period 2, and P 2 is a welfare participa-
tion dummy in period two if the recipient undergoes the program.34 A sec-
ond equation for the determination of P 2 is required but that is omitted for
brevity. The welfare trap is illustrated by the last term, which shows that the
gain to the program if the recipient goes oﬀ welfare subtracts oﬀ the lost
beneﬁt relative to the earnings gain.
The key empirical questions raised by this model are (a) what eﬀect past
programs have had on the wage rate or earnings and (b) to what degree they
have moved recipients oﬀ welfare in subsequent periods.
Moﬃtt (1996) has noted that there is a third empirical question, which
is (c) whether these programs aﬀect the desirability of being on welfare in
the ﬁrst place, which is commonly termed an eﬀect on entry into the pro-
gram.35 If the program is voluntary, no recipient can be made worse oﬀ by
its presence and the welfare program can only be enhanced in value, which
will increase the caseload by making welfare more attractive. If the pro-
gram is mandatory, it may reduce the caseload to the extent that recipients
or potential recipients see it as making them worse oﬀ.
Evidence
The main employment programs in the history of the AFDC program—
at least prior to the waiver programs of the 1990s—were the WIN pro-
gram, the WIN demonstrations of the 1980s, and the JOBS program, all
referred to in section 5.2 in the discussion of the history of the AFDC
program. As noted there, the WIN program was a work-registration pro-
gram that provided simple job placement and job search assistance to eli-
gible recipients; the WIN demonstrations tested new employment pro-
grams involving community work experience (close to workfare), work
supplementation, and heightened job search; and the JOBS program re-
quired states to oﬀer some mix of education, job skills training, job search,
on-the-job training, work supplementation, and community work experi-
ence.36
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34. The change in H2 resulting from the increase in the wage is ignored for simplicity.
35. This is a slight misnomer given the high turnover in the program. Recipients who are al-
ready on welfare but who know that they may be engaged in a program subsequently may also
change their exit decisions given the presence of the program (e.g., whether to accept a job
oﬀer oﬀ the rolls or not).
36. “Community work experience” meant workfare because it was usually work at a pub-
licly created job in the community such as cleaning up public parks. “Work supplementation”
allowed welfare departments to use welfare beneﬁts to subsidize private sector jobs. See U.S.
Congress, Committee on Ways and Means (1994, table 10.4) for the programs chosen by the
states under the JOBS programs; these usually were job search, on-the-job training, and com-
munity work experience, with sometimes some type of education. Although education was re-
quired to be one of the programs oﬀered, states rarely supplied the necessary funds to estab-
lish signiﬁcant programs of that type.Neither the WIN demonstrations nor the JOBS program was ever eval-
uated in a nationally representative sense, that is, by a random sample of
all programs around the country or by a universal sample of all programs.
Instead, there were a series of evaluations of the programs in selected state
and local areas. In both cases, probably enough areas were selected that a
reasonably good sense of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of programs were ob-
tained. For the WIN program, however, there was one major evaluation,
which was national in scope (Ketron 1980). It used a methodology that is
now regarded as undesirable (the use of individuals on waiting lists as a
comparison group) and found very modest impacts of the program on re-
cipient earnings, between $200 and $300 per year on average but larger for
public service employment.
The results of the WIN demonstration and JOBS evaluations have been
reviewed and summarized in several other places (Burtless 1995a, b; De-
vere, Falk, and Burke 2000; Gueron and Pauly 1991; Moﬃtt 1992b; O’Neill
and O’Neill 1997; Plimpton and Nightingale 2000; U.S. General Account-
ing Oﬃce 1999; see also LaLonde, chap. 8 in this volume). Both the WIN
demonstration and JOBS evaluations concentrated on answering the ﬁrst
empirical question noted above, namely, whether there is a positive return
to the programs in terms of wage rates or earnings, and devoted some at-
tention as well to the second question—whether caseloads were reduced.
Virtually no attention was paid to the third question (whether there was in-
duced entry) primarily for methodological reasons, for most of the esti-
mates of program eﬀects were obtained from random assignment trials,
and those trials are inherently incapable of estimating entry eﬀects (Moﬃtt
1992a).
The results of the evaluations of the WIN demonstration programs show
generally positive impacts on employment and earnings, with impacts on
the latter usually in the range of $300 to $600 per year. However, some pro-
grams had a much smaller impact, close to zero, and others had larger im-
pacts, occasionally around $900 per year. These impacts are not large
enough to make a major dent in the poverty rate, but are large enough to
make the programs worth considering, especially in light of the view in the
1980s that most employment programs for welfare recipients had no im-
pact at all. Furthermore, the expenditure on the WIN demonstration pro-
grams was quite small, around $500 per recipient in some cases, because
only a modest amount of services were provided; these were very small-
scale programs. The earnings impacts are perhaps larger than one might
expect from such a minor investment.37
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37. The evaluations also showed that most employment impacts arose from increases in the
amount of time employed rather than on the hourly wage rate. This is not too surprising given
that the programs made little investment in human capital. However, it also implies that the
impacts are likely to fade over time, and, indeed, Friedlander and Burtless (1995) showed that
they were gone in most sites after ﬁve years.On the other hand, another ﬁnding from the WIN demonstrations was
that the reduction in AFDC participation, caseloads, and expenditures on
AFDC beneﬁts was quite modest. The employment and earnings impacts
were either not enough to move recipients over the break-even point, or
not enough to prevent recipients from coming back onto the AFDC rolls
in suﬃcient frequency to result in signiﬁcant declines in welfare expendi-
tures.
The evaluations of the JOBS program have also generally yielded posi-
tive impacts on employment and earnings. Evaluations of the California
Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program, the best-known of
the early JOBS evaluations, showed positive earnings gains of $636 (about
25 percent) in the third year after the evaluation began (Riccio, Friedlan-
der, and Freedman 1994). The GAIN evaluation involved six diﬀerent
counties in California, and the results from an evaluation of one of the
counties—Riverside—showed especially large earnings gains (almost 50
percent) for reasons that have never been completely resolved, partly be-
cause the random assignment methodology used does not enable any rig-
orous investigation of mechanisms by which the treatment has an eﬀect.
Speculation has been that the Riverside program was so successful because
it oﬀered a particularly strong “work ﬁrst” program that emphasized im-
mediate job placement through job search (although others believe it had
a good mix of rapid-employment job search and human capital education
and training); because the labor market in Riverside was relatively weak
and hence control families did not do well; and even because of a charis-
matic and energetic director. Whatever the reason, the Riverside evalua-
tion has come to be one of the genuine success stories of employment pro-
grams in the 1990s.
One of the problems with evaluations that this illustrates is that con-
ducting experimental tests of a program in only a handful of areas, and al-
lowing each area to oﬀer a diﬀerent variation on the general program, es-
sentially prevents learning whether diﬀerential eﬀects that occur across
areas are the result of site-speciﬁc factors (the economy, charismatic direc-
tors, etc.) or of the particular program that was tested in the area. Hotz,
Imbens, and Klerman (2000) compared diﬀerent sites in the GAIN evalu-
ation to determine if the diﬀerent impacts across sites could be ascribed in-
stead to diﬀerences in the types of recipients enrolled in each site; they
found that such diﬀerences did not explain the cross-site diﬀerences.
Greenberg et al. (2001) ran regressions of the estimated program eﬀects in
each of several JOBS sites on characteristics of the area, the sample, and
the program, and found it impossible to explain the cross-site diﬀerences.
This makes it diﬃcult to use the results for policy because extrapolation to
the nation as a whole or to any other particular area around the country is
very problematic.
A JOBS evaluation involving eleven diﬀerent sites has also yielded re-
330 Robert A. Moﬃttsults but is still in progress at this writing.38 A unique aspect of this evalua-
tion was that it tested diﬀerent program strategies within the same sites,
thus eliminating some of the site eﬀects just described. For the most part,
the variation of interest was whether the program tested a rapid-
employment, low-cost job search program or a human capital, high-cost
education and training program. The distinction is important because the
TANF program that replaced AFDC emphasized the former over the lat-
ter, as part of the work ﬁrst philosophy (this was also an issue in the River-
side GAIN program, as just noted). The results to date indicate that, four
years after the evaluation began, positive employment and earnings gains
resulted, falling generally in the range of $300 to $500 per year (Freedman
2000). Both rapid-employment and human capital programs were found in
this range, although some of the human capital programs yielded results
that were lower. The trend in impacts after three years suggests that the
rapid-employment programs have large initial impacts that fade over time,
whereas the human capital programs have impacts that do not decline as
fast or may even grow over time, and that the earnings and employment
gains end up by the third year not far diﬀerent (Bloom and Michalopoulos
2001).39 This has led some observers to conclude that the two strategies
yield about the same impacts.40 If the two have the same impacts, then, be-
cause the human capital strategy is more expensive than the job-search
strategy (up to double the cost by some estimates), the former must neces-
sarily have a lower rate of return than the latter.
Another important ﬁnding from this JOBS evaluation was that, al-
though earnings impacts of the programs were positive, household income
changed very little as a result of the program. This occurred because the in-
creases in earnings were mostly cancelled out by declines in welfare bene-
ﬁts. This implies that recipients would have very little incentive themselves
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38. The evaluation began in the early 1990s, and results from a ﬁve-year follow-up measur-
ing impacts have not yet been completed.
39. In a study of the earlier GAIN program that followed recipients nine years after enroll-
ment, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000) found the same pattern when comparing treatment
eﬀects in diﬀerent counties—those with rapid-employment programs had impacts that faded
over time compared to those emphasizing education, and after nine years they were statisti-
cally no diﬀerent from each other.
40. A later analysis (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001) concluded that “mixed” strategies
were best, rather than a pure rapid-employment or pure human capital strategy. This conclu-
sion was based largely on a comparison of pure strategies in this JOBS evaluation with sev-
eral of the earlier GAIN evaluations, which were characterized as “mixed” as well—with a
dominant emphasis on one strategy but with elements of the other. The only JOBS evaluation
with such a mixed strategy was tested in one site (Portland), which stood out from the rest and
had above-average impacts. Portland was initially known as a rapid-employment program
city, but in fact it oﬀered some education and training to certain recipients. Perhaps more im-
portant, it oﬀered individualized treatments to diﬀerent types of individuals after assessing
their needs. There were other diﬀerences in the program operated in Portland as well, together
with diﬀerences in its local economic environment from those in the other cities. Unfortu-
nately, as with the Riverside GAIN program, it is almost impossible to determine what the
true reason for the diﬀerence in impacts in Portland was.to engage in these programs, unless they expected greater gains in the fu-
ture than were measured by the evaluation. This suggests that the programs
would have to be mandatory in order for the welfare departments to induce
recipients to enroll in them.
Although the overall sense of the JOBS evaluations is that there are in-
deed employment and earnings gains from these programs, both inherent
problems and practical problems with the random-assignment methodol-
ogy limit what has been learned. Aside from the diﬃculty of incorporating
entry eﬀects and separating site eﬀects from treatment eﬀects, as already
noted, many of the programs allowed control group members to start re-
ceiving the program after three years or so. Thus, impact estimates beyond
that period are not true estimates of the program by itself. In addition, in
many of the areas the local program environment continued to change af-




The suggestion that the AFDC program encourages women to have
children out of wedlock has been a staple of popular views of welfare for
decades. This popular view is consistent with the fact that AFDC beneﬁts
are primarily provided only to single-parent families and those are virtu-
ally all families with a female single parent. This view has been addressed
by a large volume of research by economists in the last ﬁfteen years or so
and by a smaller volume of work by demographers in prior years. It has
been accompanied by a more expansive examination of the eﬀects of
AFDC on family structure in general, including not only its eﬀects on
whether a woman is a single mother, but also on cohabitation, childbear-
ing, and whether a woman lives with her parents or other relatives.
Virtually any economic model of marriage, including Beckerian utility-
diﬀerences, or gains-to-marriage, models, predicts that the oﬀer of a bene-
ﬁt to an individual contingent entirely on whether he or she is unmarried
and has children will induce behavior that leads to a higher incidence of
such events. One theoretical framework that would predict the opposite is
one in which marriage is entered into voluntarily but where marital disso-
lution is an exogenous event. In this case, single motherhood is in part an
unlucky random outcome of marriage that should in principle be insured
against, and AFDC is a form of public insurance that plays that role. The
presence of such insurance should, therefore, encourage individuals to
take the risky action, namely, to enter into marriage, to a greater degree
than they would in the absence of insurance. However, the moral hazard
problem is severe, for individuals can clearly exert much control over be-
coming a single mother and, further, much single motherhood takes place
332 Robert A. Moﬃttprior to marriage. This makes insurance forces unlikely to change the net
direction of eﬀect of AFDC.
The precise rules of the AFDC program, and its two-parent counterpart,
the AFDC-UP program, complicate the incentives in several respects
(Moﬃtt, Reville, and Winkler 1994). Because eligibility for AFDC is based
on the deprivation of the support of a biological parent, a woman who
marries a man who is not the father of her children, or who cohabits with
a man who is similarly not the biological parent, is eligible for AFDC. Thus
AFDC does not discourage marriage or cohabitation universally but only
if it is with the male who is the children’s actual father. If a woman does
marry or cohabit with a nonbiological male, and that male provides ﬁnan-
cial support to the children, the income will be counted in full or in part
against the grant, and it is possible that the woman in question may end up
ﬁnancially ineligible for the program. However, at least for cohabitation,
enforcing this provision is diﬃcult. On the other hand, the AFDC-UP pro-
gram does provide some outlet, for it provides beneﬁts not only to families
where both biological parents are married, but also where they cohabit; el-
igibility is only based on the presence of both parents, not on the presence
of a legal union. However, the eligibility provisions in AFDC-UP have
been suﬃciently strict historically that it is more diﬃcult to qualify for ben-
eﬁts under it than under AFDC, so the incentives for a woman against join-
ing up with the father of her children are still quite strong.
The literature on the eﬀects of AFDC on marriage has a parallel in mod-
els of the eﬀect of the income tax, and of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), in creating marriage disincentives (for the latter, see Hotz and
Scholtz, chap. 3 in this volume). That literature is instructive because it im-
plies that even if AFDC beneﬁts were provided to married couples (or un-
married biological parents), there would still be a potential for incentives
for or against marriage. If the unit of taxation is the family, then married
couples are more likely to be above the income eligibility point—assuming
that both male and female have income—than if they are separate, to take
just one example. As the taxation literature demonstrates, the only neutral
program that does not distort family structure private incentives is one in
which beneﬁts are paid entirely on an individual basis. But then such a pro-
gram would violate vertical equity considerations and would also be com-
plicated by the presence of children. As Hotz and Scholz note, a tax or ben-
eﬁt system cannot simultaneously be progressive, treat the family as the
unit of taxation, and be neutral with respect to marriage (see also Alm,
Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington 1999).
Another theoretical observation worth noting in this context is that a
universal beneﬁt system that provides nonzero beneﬁts to all household
structures—in particular, to single individuals—could alter predictions of
the eﬀect of AFDC on marriage. If the AFDC system were altered so as to
allow beneﬁts to be paid to both married couples and single individuals,
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ten the male—could collect the beneﬁts for which he is newly eligible. In
addition, some currently single mothers and absent fathers would choose
not to marry despite the new beneﬁts they could obtain from that action
because the absent father would now also receive increased income. These
eﬀects would have to be counted against the marriage-increasing results of
the program change, with unknown, and therefore ambiguous, net eﬀect.
The AFDC program alters incentives for childbearing and living ar-
rangements as well. With regard to childbearing, the eﬀect is through the
route of single motherhood, for childbearing outside of marriage makes a
mother eligible for beneﬁts whereas childbearing inside marriage generally
does not. An additional incentive for childbearing appears in the beneﬁt
structure in states in which beneﬁts are calibrated to family size and higher
beneﬁts are paid to larger families. In this case there is an income gain to
having additional children that is not present in the absence of a govern-
ment welfare program and hence distorts choices in that direction. Living
arrangements refer generally to whether a single mother lives with others,
either her parents or a cohabiting male. The rules governing cohabitation
have already been discussed, and it is only necessary to note that living with
parents is governed by the same rules. That is, living with parents does not
alter the basic eligibility condition based on the absence of a biological par-
ent, and it will aﬀect the grant only if the parents provide ﬁnancial support
to the mother or child. However, because that type of support is more ver-
iﬁable than support from a cohabiting male, states are more likely to reduce
the beneﬁt in this case. The less-than-full taxation of parental support pro-
vides an incentive for a woman to live with her parents, as noted by
Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989). The fact that support is partly
taxed provides a disincentive for a woman to live with her parents relative
to a family-structure-neutral system in which the AFDC beneﬁt is not
aﬀected by this type of family structure. This provides another example of
the trade-oﬀs noted above that always come up in balancing equity with
neutrality in tax and transfer systems.
Evidence
There has been built up in recent years a fairly large literature on the
eﬀect of AFDC beneﬁts on family structure, mostly concerned with the
eﬀects of beneﬁts on the probability of being a single mother. The literature
has been reviewed many times, but the most recent review is by Moﬃtt
(1998) and reviewed sixty-eight separate estimates of the eﬀect of AFDC
on various aspects of marriage, fertility, and single motherhood. This re-
view covered studies conducted through approximately 1996. The results
of this survey are shown in table 5.8, which reports counts of estimates
showing insigniﬁcant, signiﬁcant, or a mixture of insigniﬁcant and signif-
icant eﬀects of welfare. The results are broken down by race, when pos-














































































































































































































































































































































































.sible, and by the source of variation in beneﬁts used to identify welfare
eﬀects—either cross-state variation in beneﬁt levels, cross-state changes in
beneﬁts (i.e., state ﬁxed eﬀects models), within-state variation assuming
the existence of some determinant of beneﬁts that does not simultaneously
directly aﬀect family structure, or pure time series studies. Overall, al-
though there is a very slight excess of signiﬁcant estimates over insigniﬁ-
cant ones across all races, it is quite small. However, the patterns diﬀer by
race and source of beneﬁt variation, with stronger eﬀects appearing for
white women, and for white women using cross-state levels and for black
women using cross-state changes in beneﬁts. The diﬀerence in how beneﬁt
variation aﬀects family structure between the two races is a result of a
diﬀerent sorting of single mothers by state for the two races, with white
single mothers tending to be concentrated in high-beneﬁt states but black
single mothers tending to be concentrated in low beneﬁt states.
Nevertheless, the most important implication of the review is that none
of the signiﬁcant estimates were in the “wrong” direction—all were in the
expected direction (positive on single motherhood, negative on marriage,
etc.). A simple unweighted average of the estimates, therefore, reveals a
central tendency suggesting the presence of an eﬀect of welfare beneﬁts on
family structure. Moreover, when distinctions are made between the stud-
ies by the likely credibility of the estimates—those controlling for the most
other variables, which concentrate on the most appropriate part of the
distribution of women, and use the most careful econometric methods—
eﬀects are sometimes stronger, sometimes substantially so (Moﬃtt 1998).
Therefore, although there is still considerable uncertainty in the literature
and there remain a large number of studies reporting insigniﬁcant esti-
mates, this reading of the literature leads to the conclusion that welfare is
likely to have some eﬀect on family structure.41
There have been a few newer studies not included in the review just de-
scribed. One of particular note is that of Hoﬀman and Foster (2000), who
were able to replicate a study of Rosenzweig (1999) using Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics data, ﬁnding signiﬁcant eﬀects of welfare on
nonmarital fertility, albeit only in certain age ranges. Foster and Hoﬀman
(2001) conducted another study with the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth and found, as have many prior studies, that welfare impacts are
greatly reduced when state ﬁxed eﬀects are added to the model. Blau,
Kahn, and Waldfogel (2000) use microdata from the 1970, 1980, and 1990
censuses to estimate metropolitan-area ﬁxed eﬀects models of the eﬀect of
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41. This is a slight change from the author’s earlier reading of the literature (Moﬃtt 1992b).
As discussed in Moﬃtt (1998), the magnitude of the eﬀect is more uncertain than the existence
of an eﬀect. Estimates range from quite small eﬀects to rather large ones. The diﬀerence is not
easily explainable by the preferred study characteristics just mentioned, and is consequently
not currently resolved.AFDC beneﬁts on marriage rates and ﬁnd them to have no statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect in their preferred models.
An issue in the literature has been that real AFDC beneﬁts have declined
over time while single motherhood rates have increased, suggesting that
beneﬁts could not have caused the rise in headship. Nechyba (2001) con-
structs a theoretical model in which social interactions between low-
income families cause lags in the response to a change in beneﬁts, consis-
tent with the hypothesis that rising welfare beneﬁts in the late 1960s and
early 1970s could have had lagged eﬀects over the next two decades (a hy-
pothesis also suggested by Murray 1984). Moﬃtt (2000) takes a more di-
rect approach and conducts a time series analysis of the relative impor-
tance of trends in female wages, male wages, and welfare beneﬁts, and ﬁnds
that a decline in the wages of less-educated males was the main contribu-
tor to the rise in female headship, and that the decline in welfare beneﬁts
slowed that rise, thus providing one possible reconciliation between the
cross-sectional and time series evidence.
The living arrangements literature has examined the eﬀects of welfare on
the propensity of a single mother to live with her parents, and on her
propensity to cohabit. Ellwood and Bane (1985) found that higher AFDC
beneﬁts were associated with greater propensities for single mothers to live
independently of parents, whereas Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz
(1989) argued that the proper variable is the relative beneﬁt between living
with and without parents—equal to the beneﬁt penalty imposed for living
with parents—and found it to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
propensity to live independently. Hu (2001) found that the probability that
a teenager in a welfare family leaves the household is inversely related to
the size of the beneﬁt reduction suﬀered by the parent if the teen were to
leave. Moﬃtt, Reville, and Winkler (1998) found cohabitation rates to be
very high among AFDC recipients, but their econometric model did not
turn up any strong eﬀects of beneﬁts, or state rules governing cohabitation,
on the likelihood of cohabiting. Evenhouse and Reilly (1999), examining
the issue with the Survey of Income and Program Participation, ﬁnd
stronger eﬀects of beneﬁts, however, on the likelihood of cohabiting with a
male who is not the natural parent of the children.
5.3.5 State Beneﬁt Determination
Models
A ﬁnal area of considerable economic research has been on the determi-
nants of state beneﬁt level and on the eﬀects of federal matching grants on
the level of state beneﬁts. The models used in this literature for state bene-
ﬁt determination are generally drawn straight from the literature on me-
dian voter models of public choice, considering aid to the poor as a posi-
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pay for those beneﬁts to be a negative argument. Income eﬀects are gener-
ally assumed to be positive, with higher median voter income leading to
greater beneﬁt levels. In the typical model, assuming a head tax on all vot-
ers to ﬁnance beneﬁts, the price of beneﬁts is equal to the per capita case-
load times one minus the federal matching rate. Thus higher caseloads
imply that the cost of a dollar increase in the beneﬁt level is greater, and a
lower matching rate implies the same. Lower matching rates, assuming
they are partially spent on tax relief or other public goods, have some
“leakage” because a dollar of grant does not translate into an extra dollar
of welfare expenditure. For many years the matching rate structure of the
federal subsidy formula for AFDC was progressive, with higher matching
rates at low beneﬁt levels than at high beneﬁt levels, thus indirectly en-
couraging a reduction in the dispersion of beneﬁt levels across diﬀerent
states. However, this structure was gradually replaced over the 1970s by a
simple constant proportional matching rate, regardless of the level of the
state beneﬁt, in an open-ended match at that rate.
Evidence
One focus of the empirical literature has been to estimate price and in-
come elasticities for beneﬁts, usually from a regression of beneﬁt levels on
state median income and on a price variable, usually constructed as the
caseload times one minus the matching rate, as just discussed.42 There are
several econometric issues that arise in such estimation that will not be dis-
cussed in detail here. The ﬁrst model of this type was conducted by Orr
(1976), who found that the federal matching rate, state per capita income,
and other variables measuring the characteristics of the taxpaying popula-
tion and the recipient population all had eﬀects on a state’s chosen beneﬁt.
Orr concluded that the results were generally supportive of a public choice
view of state beneﬁt determination. A number of additional studies were
conducted thereafter and a range of price and income elasticities obtained.
Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) have surveyed the estimates, and they conclude
that price elasticities are of the correct sign but weak in signiﬁcance and
relatively small in magnitude—in the range (–0.14, 0.02)—in contrast to
income eﬀects, which are generally signiﬁcantly positive and somewhat
larger in size—in the range (0.11, 0.82). Chernick (1998) also reviews the
evidence and argues that the price elasticities of changing the matching
rate are somewhat greater than this. Baicker (2001) uses a diﬀerent estima-
tion strategy and obtains yet higher price elasticities.
A puzzle that has garnered additional attention is the reason for the
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42. There are a number of issues in using aggregate state median income to proxy the in-
come of the median voter, and also whether median income itself identiﬁes the median pref-
erence voter. See Moﬃtt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) for a discussion.long-term decline in real AFDC beneﬁts over the 1970s and 1980s. Neither
changes in matching rates nor in income can explain the decline; in fact,
real income growth should have led to an increase in beneﬁts. Several hy-
potheses have been suggested, including that AFDC beneﬁts were replaced
by food stamp and, possibly, Medicaid beneﬁts in the voter’s utility func-
tion, or simply that voters’ preferences shifted. Shifts in the nature of the
caseload, from divorced women to unmarried mothers, has also been
posited to be partly responsible for the trend. Others have suggested that
the decline in real wages for low-skilled workers led to an increase in the
price of redistribution as well as an increase in “distance” from the median
voter, both leading to a decline in the desire for redistribution. No consen-
sus has emerged in the literature on the reasons for the change.43
5.4 Research on the TANF Program
Research on the TANF program is much smaller in volume than that on
AFDC, not only because TANF has been in existence for a shorter period
but also because economists and other researchers have encountered many
diﬃculties in studying the program that were not present, at least to the
same degree, for the AFDC program. Estimating the overall impact—that
is, the combined eﬀect of all individual component changes—of the tran-
sition from AFDC to TANF, for example, is hampered by the fact that it
was introduced in all states at approximately the same time. This is a tradi-
tional problem in studying the eﬀects of national legislation that intro-
duces a program simultaneously in all states and areas.44A second problem
is that cross-state variation under TANF is much more complex than it was
under AFDC, for in the AFDC environment most state programs were of
the same general type—because they were required to be so by federal reg-
ulation—and hence diﬀerences could be characterized by diﬀering levels
of only a few simple parameters (the guarantee, tax rate, etc.). Under
TANF, each state has freedom under the block grant to develop programs
that diﬀer from those in other states in dozens of ways. States have taken
advantage of this freedom to tailor their programs individually, with the re-
sult that there are more than ﬁfty-one dimensions by which state programs
diﬀer, leaving no degrees of freedom to estimate their eﬀects. A related
problem is that each dimension is itself quite complex and diﬃcult to mea-
sure; for example, the way a simple concept such as time limits is imple-
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43. See Orr (1979) and Gramlich (1982) for two early contributions, and Moﬃtt, Ribar, and
Wilhelm (1998) for a recent one. See Chernick (1998) for some discussions of the issues and a
review of the literature and Moﬃtt (1999b) for a discussion of the implications of this litera-
ture for explaining the 1996 welfare legislation.
44. As will be noted below, some of the pre-TANF AFDC waiver programs discussed in sec-
tion 5.2 have, however, been used in an attempt to estimate TANF eﬀects. Also, not all states
implemented their TANF programs at exactly the same time.mented can vary tremendously by the number and types of exemptions and
extensions granted, whether the state allows the “clock” to stop temporar-
ily for families, and so on. Documentation of these diﬀerences across states
has also been spotty, at times, and this has also limited research.
In what follows, the discussion will ﬁrst consider models of behavior un-
der TANF and will then consider evidence on those behaviors as well as
any other TANF issues that have been discussed in the literature.
5.4.1 Models
Many of the features of TANF can be understood as variations in pa-
rameters that were present in the simple AFDC models discussed earlier,
with equivalent predictions. Among these are reductions in welfare tax
rates, which, as noted previously, should increase the employment rate of
women initially on welfare but which has ambiguous eﬀects on overall la-
bor supply including initial ineligibles.45 Another is the imposition of fam-
ily caps, which reduce or eliminate the increase in beneﬁts ordinarily pro-
vided by the presence of additional births; this represents a simple change
in the relationship of the guarantee level to family size, with expected eﬀects
on both welfare participation and the birth rate. A third is the provisions
which make minor mothers ineligible for beneﬁts if they live apart from
their parents, which, as the living arrangements literature in AFDC makes
clear, should be expected to reduce the incidence of such living apart.
There are three new features of TANF whose eﬀects are not directly ap-
parent in the simple AFDC models discussed previously. These are work
requirements, time limits, and, to some extent, the increase in general costs
of welfare participation through provisions for diversion, numerous re-
quirements for continued participation, and informal pressure on women
to leave the welfare rolls. Each of these three will be discussed in turn.
Work requirements can, at one level, be easily incorporated in the stan-
dard static labor supply model, for they can be modeled simply as a re-
quirement that a recipient work some minimum number of hours. As illus-
trated in ﬁgure 5.8, where Hmin is the minimum required work hours, the
portion of the welfare constraint CJ is eliminated by the requirement. An
individual initially at C (work requirements are aimed at nonworkers) will
move either to J (arrow 3) or to segment AK (arrow 2)—increasing labor
supply in either case—or to point A (arrow 1), remaining as a nonworker.46
The caseload and participation rate in welfare both fall, as do expenditures
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45. Giannarelli and Wiseman (2000) have suggested that the popularity of earnings disre-
gards in the post-TANF period may partly arise from the need to satisfy federal requirements
under the TANF program that minimum fractions of the caseload be employed or engaged
in a work-like activity. Ironically, the more successful a state is in moving employable recipi-
ents oﬀ welfare and into jobs, the more likely it is to run afoul of these federal requirements.
These create a perverse incentive for states.
46. The latter is more realistic if N is positive.on beneﬁts, and average hours of work rise. If Hmin falls to the left of the
hours corresponding to point D, the work requirement is equivalent to
eliminating welfare completely. Holding Hmin ﬁxed, this is more likely in
low-guarantee states and has been shown to hold for some recipients in
those states with suﬃciently high hourly wage rates and using the oﬃcial
hours of work requirements in PRWORA.
Although work requirements achieve the goals of increased labor supply
and reduced caseloads, they do so by redeﬁning the underlying goals of the
program. Work requirements achieve work incentives by giving up on the
original negative income tax goal of achieving work incentives at the same
time as providing support to those who “cannot” work in a single, inte-
grated system that provides a guarantee to all families with no questions
asked. Welfare programs with work requirements at their center must in-
stead predeﬁne those who can work and those who cannot work; the for-
mer are provided with the beneﬁt formula illustrated in ﬁgure 5.8, and the
latter are simply given G, or possibly G plus a low tax rate as an encour-
agement to work even a small number of hours. Because making the sepa-
ration of the population—or categorization—into those who can and can-
not work is fraught with practical as well as conceptual problems, the
desirability of work requirements depends upon the magnitude of the costs
incurred by whatever system of categorization is implemented.
There have been two strands of research on these issues. One dates from
the late 1960s and early 1970s, during debates over the negative income tax.
Categorical systems were heavily criticized by economists at that time for a
variety of reasons. One was that the administrative diﬃculty in assigning re-
cipients to categories is too great, and, more generally, because economists
tend to believe that everyone can work, at least some amount, at some wage
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Fig. 5.8 Eﬀect of work requirements on labor supplyand with some kind of work support; that is, the variation in individual abil-
ity is continuous rather than discrete. Another was that, because true abil-
ity to work is partly unobserved by the policy maker, work requirement sys-
tems provide individuals with incentives to switch categories by altering, to
the extent possible, the observable characteristics that the government uses
to assign recipients to diﬀerent categories. Yet another was that, because
work requirements necessarily involve individual-speciﬁc judgments on
ability to work, they would result in excessive caseworker discretion and
consequent inequitable treatment across individuals.47
The second strand of literature examines the possible optimality of work
requirements in various models of optimal taxation. An early set of papers
demonstrated that, if heterogeneity in preferences and abilities is unob-
served by the government, then tying in-kind transfers to cash transfers
could be used to induce individuals to self-select into welfare according to
need (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988; Dye and Antle 1986; Nichols and
Zeckhauser 1982). Work requirements are an inverse case in which the im-
position of negative tied transfer—work—along with cash can be used to
induce those with higher ability to opt out of the welfare program. Beaudry
and Blackorby (1998) and Cuﬀ (2000) make this connection explicit and
introduce additional heterogeneities into the model, in both cases demon-
strating the optimality of workfare as a screening device when unobserv-
ables are present. Besley and Coate (1992b, 1995) showed that, under a
diﬀerent optimization criterion, workfare can be also used as a screening
device to ensure that higher-wage individuals do not take advantage of the
program. In this rather diﬀerent justiﬁcation for work requirements, all re-
cipients must undergo the cost of complying with work requirements, but
beneﬁts can be higher because high-wage individuals no longer have an in-
centive to apply. Another strand of the literature was that begun by Akerlof
(1978), who showed that if individuals can be tagged as truly needy, they
can be given a greater G and lower t than they could under a noncategori-
cal negative income tax. He likewise directly dealt with the incentive prob-
lem to change categories by requiring that an incentive compatibility con-
straint be set that would discourage such behavior. Although not directly
related to work requirements, it is easily extended in that direction. Unlike
the prior papers, Akerlof assumes that there are at least some observables
that can be used to discriminate between diﬀerent types of individuals.
This literature is continuing with further reﬁnements and special cases.48
The 1996 legislation has made these issues of renewed importance. The
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47. See Barth and Greenberg (1971), Browning (1975), Lurie (1975) for examples of these
early critiques of work-requirement systems as compared to a negative income tax. Barth and
Greenberg note that the drawbacks to a system that requires separating the employable and
nonemployable was a principle criticism of the AFDC program as it existed in the 1960s.
48. For example, Chone and Laroque (2001) and Immonen et al. (1998). See also Parsons
(1996) for an analysis, albeit in the context of social insurance programs, of the consequences
for these models of assuming “two-sided” error—that is, that some tagged individuals can in-
deed work as well as that some untagged individuals cannot work.PRWORA requires states to more rigorously enforce work requirements by
regularly assessing beneﬁt penalties (called “sanctions”) on those who do
not comply with the requirements (i.e., those who work less than Hmin). In-
deed, to some extent the most important work-related feature in the legis-
lation was the requirement that states, for the ﬁrst time, actually enforce the
beneﬁt reductions that ﬁgure 5.8 portrays. Within the federal guidelines,
states now have much more freedom to assess sanctions than they did un-
der the AFDC program, and many have adopted very stringent sanction
policies.49 The federal government has also tightened up the deﬁnition of
Hmin, setting speciﬁc values for it such as twenty hours per week for single
mothers with children under six, for example. States are allowed to exempt
families from the work requirement (e.g., women who are ill or incapaci-
tated, elderly, pregnant, or have a child under one year old), which can be
interpreted as the assignment of families to the “cannot work” status. How-
ever, the federal legislation also sets numerical minimums on the fraction of
a state’s recipients that must be engaged in a work activity and most of these
exempt families are not excluded from the denominator of the ratio.
Time limits are a relatively new programmatic feature and have yet to be
subjected to much economic analysis. In one sense time limits require no
new models because they simply eliminate welfare after some point and
this necessarily moves the individual to the nonwelfare constraint in ﬁgure
5.5, thereby increasing labor supply and decreasing the welfare caseload.
However, the dynamics of this response could be fairly complex if welfare
recipients anticipate the onset of time limits and alter their behavior before
hitting the limit. For example, similar to behavior that has been found for
the response to unemployment beneﬁts with a ﬁxed exhaustion point, wel-
fare recipients may begin to leave welfare prior to the time limit date, and
their leaving rates may accelerate as the time limit approaches. In the un-
employment insurance (UI) case, this behavior is generally explained by
the randomness of wage oﬀers and the desire to accept an attractive oﬀer
when it arrives even if it does so somewhat in advance of the beneﬁt ex-
haustion date. The same may apply for welfare recipients approaching a
time limit. A more complex response can occur if recipients “bank” their
beneﬁts by going oﬀ the rolls during good (labor market) times and saving
their beneﬁts for bad times (a downturn in the labor market, unexpected
negative income shock, etc.).50Whatever the model, time limits will tend to
increase labor supply and reduce welfare participation and the caseload.
The implementation of time limits in the states has been far from this
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49. For example, as noted previously, in Georgia, two violations result in a lifetime ban on
welfare receipt. Lurie (2001, 4), in a study of implementation of sanctions in local welfare
oﬃces, notes as well that discretion in using sanctions is widespread and inevitable: “While
states decide the amount of the sanctions, the decision to impose or lift a sanction is inevitably
at the discretion of the frontline worker.”
50. A few states have programs that allow recipients to receive beneﬁts for a maximum of x
years out of every y years, y   x. This would set up cyclical welfare participation response as
well as banking within the y interval.textbook portrayal. Many states have made liberal use of exemptions and
extensions from time limits, resulting in many fewer families’ hitting the
limits than anticipated. In many cases these exemptions and extensions
are granted at the discretion of individual caseworkers and local welfare
oﬃces, who make subjective judgments on whether recipients have made
ag o od faith eﬀort to ﬁnd work. Other states have put in place programs
funded out of state revenues that will support families after they exhaust
their beneﬁts, although sometimes at a reduced level and sometimes only
for the children. Still other states stop the clock from ticking if the recipi-
ent works more than a speciﬁed number of hours of work, if the recipient
has not been oﬀered a job training slot, or under other conditions. At this
writing, many fewer families have exhausted their beneﬁts than anticipated
for all these reasons as well as because so many families have left the rolls;
the latter could be either because of the favorable economy or from bank-
ing behavior. However, despite these factors, in the long run the time limit
will bind on more families if it is kept in place.
Finally, the numerous additional costs and penalties that have been im-
posed on welfare participation have resulted in many more involuntary ter-
minations under TANF than were present under AFDC. Indeed, it is no
longer clear that a simple voluntary model of welfare participation—even
one with work requirements and time limits added to the model—ade-
quately describes reality. Diversion programs and related devices to dis-
courage women who apply for the rules can still be retained in a voluntary
model but one in which the cost of application is much higher than before,
discouraging application. The cost of being on welfare even after applying
and being accepted is also raised by the many rules that TANF recipients
must obey, ranging from mandatory attendance at meetings with case-
workers to compliance with child support enforcement, requirements for
school attendance (minor TANF mothers without a high degree only), and
requirements that children of the TANF mother have regular school at-
tendance, receive immunization shots, or have health exams. Failure to
comply with any of these rules carries a penalty that may either reduce ben-
eﬁts or even terminate the families from the rolls. Finally, much anecdotal
evidence suggests that welfare departments have exercised discretion to
push women oﬀ welfare by using administrative devices to end eligibility.
These administrative terminations were thought to be present in the
AFDC program but are now much more common. This should probably
be modeled as a random involuntary termination rate from the program.
5.4.2 Evidence on TANF and Pre-TANF Waiver Reforms
As noted previously, the volume of research on TANF is necessarily
much less than that for the AFDC program. In addition, the largest volume
of data analysis conducted on TANF is descriptive in nature and does not
seek to estimate the eﬀect of the 1996 legislation in a causal sense—that is,
the eﬀect of the legislation on outcomes relative to what would have hap-
344 Robert A. Moﬃttpened if the law had not been passed. The descriptive literature, for ex-
ample, has demonstrated that poverty rates have mostly fallen since 1996,
the TANF caseload has dropped by over 50 percent since 1994, women
who have left the TANF rolls have employment rates of approximately 60
percent, and there is a lower tail of the single-mother income distribution
whose income has fallen since 1996. Separating the PRWORA contribu-
tion to these outcomes from the eﬀects of general trends, the improving
economy, and other programmatic developments (e.g., EITC and Medic-
aid expansions) is not attempted in this literature. The review to follow will
instead discuss only studies that attempt to make causal inferences.51
Table 5.9lists the studies that have estimated the overall impact of 1990s
welfare reform (i.e., the eﬀect of all the individual components combined)
on income, employment, and welfare participation outcomes.52 Studies of
the eﬀects of pre-1996 waiver reforms are shown in the ﬁrst panel of the
table. Most of these studies made use of the diﬀerential timing at which
states introduced their reforms in the pre-1996 period. With a few excep-
tions, the studies show waivers to have had positive eﬀects on most mea-
sures of labor supply and negative eﬀects on measures of AFDC partici-
pation, as expected. All of these studies include variables for the state
unemployment rate or related cyclical variables in their models, and hence
the estimated eﬀects of welfare reform are all intended to be net of the
strong economy.
Two exceptions to the results are Bartik and Eberts (1999) and Ziliak et
al. (2000) who ﬁnd very little eﬀect of welfare reform, net of the economy,
on the size of the AFDC caseload. The main diﬀerence between these two
studies and the others is that these two enter the lagged AFDC caseload
into the regression model. The reduction in the estimated size of the eﬀect
of welfare reform is an indirect sign that states that implemented reforms
had above-average caseloads and that caseloads regressed to the mean
thereafter, causing a spuriously estimated decline in the caseload in the
studies that omit this lag. A debate has ensued over the econometric prop-
erties of including lagged dependent variables in the models in question,
which has not yet been resolved.53
Randomized trials are represented in two of the entries in table 5.9.
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51. See Moﬃtt and Ver Ploeg (2001) for a list of all types of studies that have been con-
ducted on TANF as of approximately spring 2001, including descriptive studies, as well as a
comprehensive discussion of the alternative evaluation methodologies that have been used to
estimate causal eﬀects of welfare reform.
52. A number of studies are excluded from the table, including those conducted on a single
state but which were not random assignment, and a number of random assignment evalua-
tions that were discontinued or that have not produced results (Harvey, Camasso, and Jagan-
nathan 2000 has a comprehensive list).
53. Klerman and Haider (2001) demonstrate that building up an aggregate caseload model
from a more fundamental set of entry and exit equations will necessarily result in the need for
lags in the aggregate model. However, they argue that the caseload model that results from
this aggregation is easily misspeciﬁed because of duration dependence and other properties




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.These studies made use of traditional random-assignment methods rather
than cross-state variation to estimate the eﬀects of reform. These studies
generally also ﬁnd positive eﬀects on employment and earnings and nega-
tive eﬀects on welfare participation, like the nonexperimental studies.54
However, the estimated eﬀects on both income and welfare participation
are considerably smaller than those estimated from the nonexperimental
literature. This may be because random-assignment methods are not well
suited for major structural reforms like the pre-1996 welfare waivers—or
for TANF itself—because such structural reforms tend to cause changes in
local labor markets and local communities that feed back onto the control
group. The policy-induced changes in the economic and programmatic en-
vironment, and in the expectations of the eligible population for what level
of work is to be required of welfare recipients, are unlikely not to have
aﬀected the control group. This is likely to have made control and experi-
mental group behavior more similar and therefore to have biased estimated
eﬀects downward. Another important diﬀerence between experimental
and nonexperimental estimates is that the former cannot capture entry
eﬀects, whereas the latter can. Much of the eﬀect of welfare reform on the
caseload, and therefore also on labor supply and earnings, has occurred
through decreased entry onto welfare. This will also lead to bias in the ex-
perimental estimates.
The more important policy issue is the eﬀect of TANF, for the welfare
waivers fell far short of the major restructuring that occurred after 1996
and hence cannot be taken as predictive of the eﬀects of TANF. Unfortu-
nately, estimating TANF eﬀects is more diﬃcult than estimating the eﬀects
of waivers because the vast majority of the states more or less implemented
TANF at the same time, leaving no cross-state variation in the timing of in-
troduction to use for estimation. Two studies made use of the fact that four
or ﬁve states actually implemented reforms somewhat later than the rest of
the states, but this source of variation is unlikely to be reliable because
there may have been unique diﬀerences between those states and the oth-
ers which were correlated with their late implementation, and because
there are likely to be signiﬁcant lags in the eﬀects of the reforms. Most stud-
ies have, instead, used diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods which compare
trends in outcomes for low-wage or less-educated single mothers to trends
in outcomes of various other groups (high-wage or highly educated single
mothers, or women who are not single mothers) to assess the eﬀect of wel-
fare reform. As Ellwood (2000) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) note, use of
these methods is particularly problematic when other reforms, such as the
EITC, were occurring roughly simultaneously, and when business-cycle and
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54. There have been many more random-assignment studies in this period, but those listed
in table 5.9 are those that had the main features of PRWORA, namely, time limits, work re-
quirements, sanctions, and enhanced earnings disregards, and that made these reforms within
the AFDC system rather than outside of it.economywide trends were occurring that could aﬀect diﬀerent groups dif-
ferently. Ellwood concludes that these diﬃculties are suﬃciently severe that
the separate contributions of welfare reform, the EITC, and the economy
cannot be identiﬁed. The only remaining studies in the table (excluding
Wallace and Blank 1999, which uses pure time series variation) are Mc-
Kernan et al. (2000) and Schoeni and Blank (2000), one of which ﬁnds TANF
to have increased employment, whereas the other ﬁnds it not to have done
so but to have aﬀected family earnings, income, and AFDC participation.
The two studies used diﬀerent control groups, so this may be the source of
the diﬀerence. What evidence there is, therefore, indicates some TANF
eﬀects in the expected direction, but the small number of studies and prob-
lems in statistical inference make the conclusions rather uncertain.
There have also been a number of studies that have attempted to esti-
mate the separate eﬀects of diﬀerent components of pre-1996 waiver re-
forms or of TANF, such as time limits, work requirements, sanctions, earn-
ings disregards, and other features. Unfortunately, the results from these
studies have been inconsistent with each other (often providing opposite-
signed eﬀects) have generated many insigniﬁcant eﬀects, and have gener-
ally yielded an uninterpretable set of ﬁndings.55 There are many likely rea-
sons for this pattern, including the enormous proliferation of diﬀerent
policies across the states and the diﬃculty in accurately characterizing
those diﬀerences with a few simple variables; inherent diﬃculty in separat-
ing the eﬀects of one component from another when they no doubt
strongly interact; diﬀerences in the oﬃcial characterization of policies
from those implemented in practice; and lack of statistical power in the
data to detect reasonable-sized eﬀects. For whatever reason, despite the
initial view that the devolution that would follow PRWORA would gener-
ate useful cross-state variation in policies for research, very little progress
has been made in that direction to date.56
There has been some research as well on the impact of pre-1996 waivers
and TANF on demographic outcomes such as marriage, fertility, and liv-
ing arrangements. The direction of impact of reform on marriage and fer-
tility is ambiguous at the simplest level, for although a reduction in the
caseload and generosity of a program that mainly supports one-parent
families should have positive eﬀects on marriage and negative eﬀects on
childbearing, an increase in women’s employment should have the oppo-
site eﬀects, as demonstrated by a large empirical literature on the eﬀect of
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55. See Bell (2001) for a discussion of the results with caseloads as a dependent variable.
56. In addition, with a few exceptions, there have been no random-assignment evaluations
that have varied each feature of reform individually while holding all the other features ﬁxed,
even though this is possible in principle in an experiment. It should also be noted that Grog-
ger (2000, 2001) has attempted to estimate the independent eﬀects of time limits by using age
variation in children combined with assumptions that that variation does not interact identi-
cally with other welfare reform features. The validity of the assumptions needed for these
methods to be valid is unknown.female wages and labor supply on marriage and fertility. In addition to
these broad factors, TANF allows states to impose family caps (restrictions
on additional beneﬁts from extra births while on welfare) and denies ben-
eﬁts to minor mothers who wish to live apart from their families, both of
which should be expected to have direct eﬀects on family structure.
The evidence to date on the presence of an eﬀect of welfare reform as a
whole on these outcomes is suggestive of a weak eﬀect, at best. Analyses of
pre-1996 waivers are inconsistent, with some showing a negative eﬀect on
nonmarital fertility (Horvath and Peters 1999) and others showing no
eﬀect (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2001). Analyses of TANF using diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence methods, comparing either more-educated and less-educated
women or high-wage and low-wage women, show no eﬀect of TANF on
marriage but possibly a negative eﬀect on living independently (Ellwood
2000; Schoeni and Blank 2000). Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2002) found
a positive eﬀect of TANF on the likelihood that a child lives with neither
parent and a negative eﬀect on the probability of living with an unmarried
parent, but the eﬀects were estimated only on cross-state variation in
TANF implementation dates within a fourteen-month window. Random-
assignment evaluations are particularly problematic for the study of fam-
ily structure because of the entry-eﬀect problem and the problems of
contamination noted earlier. Of those noted in table 5.9, only one (the
Delaware study) showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect on marriage. The reason that
particular experiment showed an eﬀect and others did not is not clear.
The evidence on the speciﬁc eﬀects of family caps and living arrange-
ments restrictions in the law is quite weak, for the same reason that sepa-
rating the impacts of the individual components of welfare reform from
each other has not been successful in the study of employment and earn-
ings impacts. Some waiver evaluations, particularly one conducted in New
Jersey (Camasso et al. 1998a, b), have been used to assess the eﬀects of fam-
ily caps, but these evaluations are problematic because the family cap was
bundled in with changes in work requirements, earnings disregards, and
other features common in welfare waiver programs. Thus there is no direct
evidence from random-assignment evaluations of family cap eﬀects be-
cause none has varied the presence of the family cap, holding other reform
features ﬁxed.
Finally, there has been considerable analysis of the eﬀect of the block
grant structure of TANF on spending on the poor. As noted previously, the
shift from a matching to a block grant should be expected to reduce spend-
ing. Predictions of the magnitude of the spending decline depend directly
on the size of the price elasticity of beneﬁts, which, as noted before, is not
agreed upon in the empirical literature. Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) predict
very small reductions, whereas Chernick (1998) predicts beneﬁt declines in
the range of 15 to 30 percent (see also Chernick and McGuire 1999); In-
man and Rubinfeld (1997) predict spending declines of 40 to 66 percent in
350 Robert A. Moﬃttlow-income states and 0 to 18 percent in high-income states. In addition,
there has been considerable speculation that there will be a “race to the
bottom,” as states facing a higher price of beneﬁts become more sensitive
to the inﬂuence of cross-state migration in search of higher beneﬁts, lead-
ing to a cascading series of real beneﬁt cuts across the states. Theoretical
work supports this intuitive prediction, and simulations suggest that ben-
eﬁts could be seriously underproduced in such a system relative to the so-
cial optimum (Brueckner 2000; Wheaton 2000).
To date, none of these predictions have been capable of testing because
the block grant levels in the 1996 legislation were set at 1994 AFDC levels.
Because the AFDC-TANF caseload has fallen so drastically since 1994,
states have generally not been able to spend all of their block grant funds.
Thus the block grant constraint has not become binding, and hence one
should not expect either the (extra) spending declines or the race to the
bottom predicted in the literature to have occurred. Further work on this
issue must await a rise in spending up to the block grant level.57
5.5 Reforms: Financial Incentives
Most reform discussions at the current point in the evolution of the
AFDC-TANF program concern whether the provisions of the 1996 wel-
fare law should be modiﬁed in some way, such as changing or removing the
time limits, work requirements, rules governing sanctions, block grant and
funding formulas, and the like. There has been no research on the eﬀects of
altering these provisions beyond what has already been discussed in the re-
view of research on AFDC and TANF; as noted, the research base for fore-
casting the eﬀects of altering most of these provisions is exceedingly slim.
One area of discussion where economists have a strong research base is
in the area of additional ﬁnancial incentives to encourage TANF recipients
to work, which is the traditional area of interest in the economics literature.
Three diﬀerent types of reforms have been discussed: (a) reductions in the
tax rate on earnings in the TANF program (or what are called “enhanced
earnings disregards” in policy discussions); (b) earnings or wage subsidies
made available only to those on TANF; and (c) earnings or wage subsidies
made available universally to the low-income population. Each will be dis-
cussed in turn.
Reductions in the tax rate on earnings have been enacted by many states
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57. In fact, TANF spending by the states stopped declining in 1998 and has risen since then,
even though the economy was still strong, because states began spending their funds on an-
cillary services like child care. If this trend continues, it is likely that a relatively modest re-
cession could force spending up to the block grant level. Other issues debated in the literature
are the adequacy of countercyclical funds to alleviate the potential spending volatility under
a block grant system, and how to reduce inequities in the block grants to high- and low-
income states.in their post-reform beneﬁt schedules, as noted earlier in this review, as a
means to encourage work among recipients in addition to work require-
ments. Economic models predict that the eﬀect of reducing welfare tax rates
on labor supply is ambiguous in sign because new recipients are drawn onto
the welfare rolls, whose labor supply is thereby reduced. The majority of the
evidence, both from nonexperimental and negative income tax (NIT) ex-
perimental studies, indicates that the net eﬀect of such reductions on labor
supply is approximately zero. This should, therefore, be the prediction one
should make for the recent tax rate reductions enacted by the states.
A few recent experiments have addressed the labor supply eﬀects of re-
duced welfare tax rates and have shown, instead, that they generally in-
crease earnings and employment (Berlin 2000; Blank, Card, and Robins
2000). However, the majority of these experiments only test the eﬀects of
reduced tax rates on those who are initially on welfare, and, for that group,
positive eﬀects on labor supply should occur. Consequently, although the
experimental results are of value because they conﬁrm, in broad outlines,
the predictions of the static labor supply model for how initial recipients
would respond, they do not contradict the literature from prior economet-
ric studies and the NIT experiments because they do not account for the
oﬀsetting labor supply eﬀects of new entry.58
A new element in recent discussions, however, is an emphasis on cou-
pling work requirements and minimum hours restrictions with tax rate re-
ductions. The argument is that the work requirement limits the negative la-
bor supply eﬀects that serve as an oﬀset to the work incentives of tax rate
reductions and is thus superior to welfare programs with tax rate reduc-
tions but no work requirements, and that tax rate reductions accompanied
by such restrictions are more likely to increase labor supply.59However, this
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58. See Blank, Card, and Robins (2000) for a discussion of entry and how it might be re-
duced by imposing barriers such as a waiting period before the ﬁnancial incentives are allowed
(see also Card, Robins, and Lin 1998). Berlin (2000, 35) also draws a contrast between the ﬁnd-
ings of these recent experiments and those of the NIT experiments, noting that the NIT re-
duced labor supply whereas the tax rate reductions in the new experiments increased labor
supply. However, this is not a proper comparison because the negative labor supply eﬀects in
the NIT experiments pertained to the eﬀect of an NIT versus nothing at all (i.e., the treatment–
control group comparison), which is expected to be negative from simple theory. In fact, as
noted previously, the alternative treatment groups in the NIT experiments that tested alterna-
tive welfare tax rates holding the guarantee ﬁxed found generally a zero net eﬀect on labor
supply, consistent with the ﬁndings of complete oﬀset in nonexperimental econometric mod-
els. The NIT experiments included not just recipients but rather a sample of the entire low-
income population, so that the oﬀsetting, negative eﬀects of lowering the tax rate were cap-
tured by the comparison of outcomes across alternative treatment groups. This is entirely
consistent with a positive eﬀect on labor supply of those initially on welfare, and therefore the
results of the NIT experiments and recent recipient-only experiments are not inconsistent.
59. Again, see Berlin (2000) and Blank, Card, and Robins (2000) for a discussion of these
programs, such as New Hope and the SSP program. Some of the programs tested in these
demonstrations allowed recipients to take their “earnings supplements” (i.e., beneﬁts) oﬀ
welfare. However, in the type of pure transfer program illustrated in ﬁgure 5.8, it is immate-
rial whether individuals receiving beneﬁts in the region above point K are called welfare re-
cipients or not; they are incontrovertibly welfare recipients in the behavioral sense.is an incorrect comparison because, as discussed previously, work require-
ments achieve their positive eﬀects on labor supply by eliminating govern-
ment support for those who do not work, which is the rationale for an in-
come support program in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, they must be
accompanied by a categorization of the population into those who can and
cannot work. The relative merits of the two approaches depend on whether
the stronger labor supply eﬀects provided by the work requirement system
are countered by the ineﬃciencies, disincentives, and possible inequities
created by a feasible categorization system.
Some programs with such minimum full-time work conditions have
been voluntary instead of mandatory (e.g., New Hope, Self-Suﬃciency
Program [SSP], and some treatments in the Minnesota Family Investment
Program [MFIP]). That is, the greater beneﬁts made possible by the reduc-
tion in the tax rate, and which are available only if hours worked are close
to full time, are simply oﬀered to the recipient as an option. Such a pro-
gram is not a work requirement program at all but is instead just an NIT
with part of the budget constraint deleted (namely, the portion in the part-
time range). Relative to an NIT with no hours restrictions, a voluntary pro-
gram of this type would aﬀect labor supply in an ambiguous direction, as
some who would have worked part time chose to work full time but some
chose not to work at all. Relative to a program with a tax rate of 100 per-
cent, however, such a restricted tax reduction is indeed more likely to in-
crease labor supply than an unrestricted NIT. But that does not mean that
it is preferable, because then the issue is why part-time work is not desirable
and why the beneﬁts of work supplements should be denied to those who
can only work part-time, some of whom will instead choose not to work
at all.60
The second type of program, oﬀering wage or earnings subsidies to wel-
fare recipients instead of reducing welfare tax rates, has essentially the
same eﬀect if those subsidies are permitted only for those who remain on
welfare. It is immaterial whether an increase in W(1 – t) comes from an in-
crease in W or a reduction in t.61 The major alternative proposal is instead
that welfare recipients be allowed to carry those subsidies oﬀ the welfare
rolls and to keep them after exiting. The eﬀect of this reform on the budget
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60. This illustrates the more general principle that increases in labor supply should not be
the sole criterion for judging a reform because it must always take into account how the rela-
tive beneﬁts of program expenditure are spread across individuals at diﬀerent points on the
budget constraint and therefore diﬀerent points in the income distribution. For example, it
should always be possible in principle to increase labor supply simply by oﬀering the popula-
tion a large increase in income to anyone willing and able to work high enough hours; that is
incontrovertible. But that costs money, and the proper comparison for such a program is in-
stead with an equal-expenditure program which would therefore have to reduce funds going
to low-hours workers. The issue of distributional weights, and the relevant optimal tax prob-
lem, cannot be avoided.
61. The two may have diﬀerent eﬀects around the break-even level, however depending on
how the phaseout and cutoﬀ of the earnings or subsidy are handled. A simple graphical anal-
ysis easily demonstrates this (not shown for brevity).constraint is shown in ﬁgure 5.9, where CDE is the initial constraint and
CD E  is the constraint after the subsidy is implemented.62 Assuming that
substitution eﬀects dominate income eﬀects and therefore that labor
supply curves for this population group are forward-bending, this change
has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on labor supply relative to the initial
welfare program for those initially on the welfare portion of the constraint.
The drawbacks to such subsidies are the same as those for a universal wage
or earnings subsidy, to be considered next.
It is worth noting that this type of program would approach that of a uni-
versal subsidy program if (a) those who carry the subsidy oﬀ the program
are allowed to keep it indeﬁnitely and (b) all eligibles in the population have
a ﬁnite probability of entering the program within their lifetimes. If both of
these conditions hold, all eligibles, including those initially on segment
DE, will eventually cycle through the program and hence will have the sub-
sidy available to them oﬀ welfare.
The third reform is indeed the oﬀer of a universal earnings or wage sub-
sidy to all low-income families. Graphically, this is identical to ﬁgure 5.9
except that those initially oﬀwelfare, on segment DE, are also eligible. The
relative merits of wage rate and earnings subsidies, on the one hand, and
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Fig. 5.9 Eﬀect of earnings subsidy on budget constraint
62. Assuming the subsidy is s percent of earnings, the on-welfare portion of the constraint,
segment CD , has slope W(1   s)(1 – t), while the oﬀ-welfare portion of the constraint, seg-
ment D E , has slope W(1  s). This assumes that the subsidy is included in countable income
by the welfare agency along with presubsidy earnings; if it does not, the on-welfare portion of
the constraint has slope W(1 – t  s). The ﬁgure assumes t   1.0, but all statements in the text
apply as well for t   1.an NIT or similar income support program with a G and t, on the other,
were debated extensively in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Barth and
Greenberg 1971; Garﬁnkel 1973; Kesselman 1969, 1973; Zeckhauser
1971). That literature showed that there will almost certainly be positive
eﬀects on labor supply if an income support program is completely re-
placed by a wage or earnings subsidy. This should not be surprising since
beneﬁts are no longer paid to nonworkers under a wage or earnings sub-
sidy, and since, from a equity and distributional point of view, a progres-
sive tax system is replaced by a regressive one. As this early literature rec-
ognized (Kesselman 1969; Barth and Greenberg 1971), and has been noted
in this review, replacing an income support program with such a subsidy
would require a categorization of the eligible population that has its own
diﬃculties which would have to be factored into the comparison.
The literature also addressed the relative merits of wage rate versus earn-
ings subsidies. In general, the former were shown to be superior but were
acknowledged to have implementation problems created by the need for
employers and workers to document hours of work, and the strong incen-
tives for fraudulent reporting of those hours and for collusion between
workers and employers to overreport hours worked. To date, these diﬃcul-
ties have prevented a wage rate subsidy from being enacted in the United
States. Earnings subsidies, on the other hand, have the disadvantage that
they must be phased out at some earnings level; at and above that point, la-
bor supply disincentives are created.63 The corresponding issue for welfare
reform is how eligibility for a universal earnings or wage subsidy program
aimed at the welfare-eligible population would be determined. If family in-
come is used as the eligibility criterion, then a notch will be created at that
income level where the subsidy is lost, creating disincentives to go beyond
that point as well as incentives for those with higher income to reduce la-
bor supply to become eligible. Alternatively, if the subsidy is phased out
gradually, as it is in earnings subsidies such as the EITC, then work disin-
centives will be created in that region, which will have to be counted against
the positive labor supply incentives created at lower earnings levels. Thus
the oﬀsetting eﬀects of earnings subsidies on labor supply cannot be
avoided.64
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63. See the chapter on the EITC (Hotz and Scholz, chap. 3 in this volume) for a discussion.
64. Once again, an alternative program oﬀers universal earnings subsidies to low-income
families but with a minimum hours constraint. As before, the increased labor supply eﬀects
of this program would have to be balanced by the increased need for categorization of the
population, at least if it were made mandatory. If it is made voluntary, then, as noted previ-
ously, the only issue is whether part-time work should not also be subsidized. It should also
be noted that, with a mandatory minimum hours constraint, there is little diﬀerence between
a wage or earnings subsidy program and an NIT-like income support program with a reduced
tax rate, for the two only diﬀer in the nature of the budget constraint above the hours con-
straint point. If the major labor supply decision is the margin between working at the con-
straint point or locating below it oﬀ welfare, the two programs would have the same eﬀects.5.6 Summary
Although the 1996 legislation is now six years past, the TANF program
must still be regarded as being in a state of transition and not as having
fully coalesced into a ﬁnal form. The implementation of the program, as
well as myriad of its provisions, such as the imposition of stricter work re-
quirements with more rigorously enforced sanctions for noncompliance
and the imposition of time limits, continues to evolve. States are continu-
ing to modify their programs and attempt to change them over time, as
they search for new ways to deal with the diﬃculties of the population that
they aim to serve. The uncertainties created by a possible recession, the in-
creasing impact of time limits as more recipients hit those limits over the
next few years, and the possibility of further congressional action, all have
the potential to lead to further modiﬁcations in the program.
While research on the AFDC program is still useful in many ways, and
while the models developed for that program are still applicable to TANF,
there are many new features of TANF whose eﬀects cannot be easily ex-
trapolated from AFDC research results. At the same time, direct evalua-
tion of the eﬀects of the TANF program, particularly the evaluation of the
independent contributions of its separate individual components, poses
many empirical challenges. Although the evidence to date is reasonably
strong that the TANF program has increased employment and earnings
and decreased the caseload, relative to what would have occurred if AFDC
had remained in place, the separate eﬀects of work requirements, time lim-
its, sanctions, family caps, and other individual features are essentially un-
known. These continuing research challenges, as well as those posed by ad-
ditional modiﬁcations in the TANF program as they occur, will provide a
rich agenda for further research.
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